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Legal Consequences of Globalization:
The Status of Non-Governmental Organizations
Under International Law
KARSTEN NOWROT

INTRODUCTION

On December 20, 1996, former Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, issued a report "Agenda for Democratization," in
which he observed that international relations "are increasingly shaped not
only by the States themselves but also by an expanding array of non-State
actors on the 'international' scene."' Furthermore, the State parties to the
recent Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction of September 18,
1997, recognize in the preamble the efforts "undertaken by the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines and numerous other nongovernmental organizations around the
world." In addition, in the recent statement of May 20, 1998, by the President
of the Security Council of the United Nations concerning the situation in
Sierra Leone, the Security Council expressly recognized "the important role
played by . . . nongovernmental organizations" in the internationally
monitored peace process in that country.3
These few and randomly chosen examples highlight a significant aspect
of the contemporary international system: the growing influence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the international realm. NGOs such
as Greenpeace and Amnesty International are increasingly participating in the
international decisionmaking process by advocating new international policy
agendas and agitating for changes in existing international legal regimes.
*
LL.M. 1998, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. First State Exam in Law,
University of Kiel (Germany), 1997. I would like to thank Dean Alfred C. Aman, Jr., as well as Prof. Jost
Delbrack, and Prof. David P. Fidler for their advice and support in the preparation of this Article.

i. Boutros Bourtos-Ghali, An Agenda for Democratization, 51 st Sess., at 973, U.N. Doc. A/51/761
(1996).
2. See preamble to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use. Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997 (visited Jan. 25, 1999)

<httpJ/www.uraorg/Depts/Landmine/UNDocs/bantrty.htm>.
3. U.N. SCOR, 3882nd ntg., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1998/13 (1998).
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They are also active in the enforcement of international law by monitoring
State compliance with international legal rules and through their incorporation
in international regimes, as in the areas of environmental protection,
international human rights, and humanitarian law. These developments are
increasingly viewed as a growing challenge to the role of the nation-state in
international relations, first to their position as the primary actor in the
international system,4 and second, to the notion of statehood itself.5
This Article analyzes the legal consequences of the changing international
system for the legal status of NGOs under international law. Although it has
been advocated that their lack of legal status under international law allows
NGOs to define their role unconstrained by law and to develop more creative
and effective approaches,6 this Article argues that there is a need to establish
an international legal status for NGOs. On one side, the participatory rights
of NGOs must be strengthened in order to secure their position in the
international decisionmaking process. On the other side, taking into account
the already existing influence of NGOs in the international system, the
question arises whether there is a need for a global legal framework in order
to set limits on the influence of powerful interest groups like Greenpeace,7 and
to provide some accountability for these organizations for the consequences
of their actions.'
Part I provides a short overview of the history and evolution of NGOs as
actors in the international realm. Part II evaluates the reasons for the growing
participation of NGOs in the contemporary international system. Next,
turning to an analysis of the increasing international influence of NGOs, Part
HI describes the different functions of these non-State actors in the
international decisionmaking process, their monitoring of State compliance
with international law, and their role in the creation of independent legal

4. See, e.g., Jost Detbrlck, The Role ofthe UnitedNations in Dealing With GlobalProblems,4 IND.
J.GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 277, 294-95 (1997); Peter J. Spiro, New GlobalCommunities:Nongovernmental
Organizationsin the InternationalDecision-MakingInstitutions, 18 WASIL Q. 45, 46 (1995).
5. See generallyStephan Hobe, Global Challenges to Statehood: The IncreasinglyImportantRole
of Nongovernmental Organizations, 5 IND. J.GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191 (1997) [hereinafter Hobe];
TAT UND NTEIREPENDENZ 330
STEPRHHOBE, DER OFFENE VER ASSUNOSSTAT ZWScHB SOuvR
(1998).
6. See A Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development of
InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 64 (1992).
7. See Delbrjck, supra note 4, at 295; Karl Zemanek, The Legal Foundationsof the International
System, 266 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 42 (1997).
8. See Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the
"Unregulated"Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957,962-67 (1996).
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orders, such as in the area of international sports law. Furthermore, Part III
discusses possible advantages and problems resulting from the growing
participation of NGOs, as well as their legitimacy to contribute to global
governance.
Part IV, examines whether the character of the international system
requires the legal integration of NGOs into international law. After outlining
the controversy over the character of the international system, it concludes that
the international system is a legal community which would be supported by
a legal integration ofNGOs. In Part V, possible legal constructions for giving
NGOs an international legal status are evaluated, among them the question
whether NGOs can already be considered subjects of international law. In
addition, some strategies and their advantages and problems for the
enforcement of international law against NGOs are discussed in Part VI.
Finally, Part VII examines the question whether, because of the changes in the
contemporary international society, the international system can already be
regarded as transforming into a global society through the impact of NGO
activities.
I. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF NGOs AS
ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Some authors contend that the history of non-State actors in the
international system started after World War II because of increased NGO
activities following the creation of the United Nations.9 Although non-State
actors like NGOs are today more numerous and influential than ever before,
they cannot in general be regarded as a completely new phenomenon mi
international relations. The appearance on the international scene of
predecessors to contemporary NGOs, as well as to other non-State actors like
transnational corporations," can be dated back, depending on the viewpoint,
to some decades or even to some centuries ago.
As the earliest examples of international NGOs, one can probably point
to the Christian churches and their spiritual and secular orders that formed in

9. See, e.g., Christopher Tracy, The Roots of Influence: Nongovernmental Organizationsand the
Relationship Between Human Rights a'nd the Environment,3 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 21, 29 (1994).
10. See Peter Fischer, TransnationalEnterprises,in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW 515, 516-17 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1981); Peter Fischer, Das Transnationale Unternehmen als
Phanomen in der Vokerrechtsgeschichte,in VOLKERRBCHT UND RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE-INTERNATIONALE
FESTSCHRIFT FUR STEPHAN VEROSTA 345 (Alfred Verdross et al. eds., 1980).
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the 6th century A.D. and represented the only private transnational networks
at that time." Two of these entities-the Holy See and the Sovereign Order
of Malta-are still today legally recognized actors under international law."
These two entities have diplomatic relations with many States, they have
participated in many major international conferences with States, and they are
parties to some multilateral treaties as well as members of some international

organizations. 3
However, an international system of sovereign States did not exist in
medieval times, which were characterized by a system based on strongly
hierarchical and parallel religious or secular concepts of subordination and
dependence. 4 It therefore remains doubtful whether these entities can be
regarded as "nongovernmental" in the modem sense, and for that reason it has
been suggested in the legal literature that, for many centuries, the status of at
least the Holy See is ambiguous, and it can also be regarded as a State actor."
The first associations which can be seen as the direct predecessors of
today's NGOs appear in the late eighteenth century when private individuals
with shared interests created issue-oriented organizations to influence
policymaking. 6 Slavery and the slave trade inspired the foundation of early
NGOs, like the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery

11. Hernann H.-K. Rechenberg, Non-Governmental Organizations,in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 276, 278 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1981). See also YVES BEIGBEDER, THE ROLE AND
STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN VOLUNTEERS AND ORGANIZATIONS 8 (1991); LYMAN
CROMWELL WHITE, INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 4 (195 1).
12. On the Sovereign Order of Malta, see B. de Fischer, L 'OrdreSouverain de Malte, 163 RECUEIL
DES COURS 1 (1979/2); Gerald I. Draper, FunctionalSovereignty and the Sovereign MilitaryHospitaller
Order of SaintJohn ofJerusalem, ofMalta, ANNALES DE L'ORDRE SOUVERAIN MLTAIRE DE MALTE 78
(1974). Concerning the Holy See, see ROBERT JENNINOS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW 325-29 (9th ed. 1992); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 152-60
(1979); Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, On the Nature ofthe InternationalPersonalityof the Holy See, 29 REvUE
BELGE DE DROrT INT'L 354 (1996/2).
13. See generally JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 12, at 328-29 & n.7. On the international relations
of the Holy See, see also JOSEF L. KuNz, THE CHANGING LAW OF NATIONS 276-84 (1968). See generally
2 CHARLES ROUSSEAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 353-77 (1974).
14. See, e.g., Christopher Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm
for InternationalLaw, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 447 (1993).
15. See, e.g., Yasrnin Abdullah, The Holy See at UnitedNations Conferences: State or Church?, 96
COL. L. REv. 1835 (1996).
16. Steve Chamovitz, Two Centuries ofParticipation: NGOs and InternationalGovernance, 18
MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 191 (1997); Peter Macalister-Smith, Non-Governmental Organizations,
HumanitarianAction and Human Rights, in REC-T ZWiSCHEN UMERUH UND BEWAHRuNG 477, 483
(Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds., 1995).
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in 1775 and the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society in 1839.1 These
NGOs started to become transnational and connected to each other across
borders in their efforts in the middle of the nineteenth century by organizing
international conferences like the International Anti-Slavery Conference in
London in 1840."
The most notable example of this period for the successful promotion of
international legal regimes by NGOs is the activity of the International
Committee of the Red Cross. Shocked by the brutality of the Italian wars of
unity, especially the battle of Solverino, the Swiss citizen Henry Dunant in
1863 persuaded the Geneva Public Welfare Society to set up a committee to
address the humanitarian situation of wounded soldiers. 9 The organization
successfully lobbied for an international governmental conference, which took
place in 1864 and at which European States adopted the Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.2" From
that time on, the International Committee of the Red Cross, a private
organization run by Swiss citizens 2 and supported by a network of national
Red Cross societies around the world, has played a major role in the
development of international humanitarian law.22 Other initiatives, which
were inspired by or led to the creation of NGOs in the nineteenth century,
were the peace movement,' the promotion of international law,24 worker

17. See J.J.LADoR-LEDERER, INTERNATIONALNON-GOVERNmENTALORGANIZATIONSAND ECONOMIC
ENTrrES-A STUDY IN AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION AND IUS GENTIUM 112 (1963); Ethan A. Nadelmann,

Global ProhibitionRegimes: The Evolution ofNorms in InternationalSociety, 44 INT'L ORO. 479, 495
(1990).
18. Chamovitz, supranote 16, at 192; Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 495.
19. See Chamovitz, supra note 16, at 200.
20. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, Aug.
22, 1864, 129 ConsoL T.S. 361. See generally MALCOLM N. SHAW 806-23 (4th ed. 1997).
21. See Anton Schl8gel, IRC-InternationalRed Cross, in 2 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, PoLciEs AND
PRACTCE 814, 815 (Radiger Wolfium & Christiane Philipp eds., 1995).
22. See, e.g., David P. Forsythe, InternationalHumanitarianAssistance:The Role ofthe Red Cross,
3 BUF. J. INT'L L 235 (1996).
23. See generally EDSON L WHrTNEY, THE AMERICAN PEACE SOCIETY: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY
(1928); F.L HINSLEY, POWER AND TM PuRsurr OF PEACE (1967).
24. The most notable example is the nstitut de Droit International, founded in 1873. JAMES W.
GARNER, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 655 (1925). On the founding of other
organizations like the American Society of International Law and the Association of International Law in
Japan, see, for example, Frederic L Kirgis, The Formative Years of the American Society ofInternational
Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L 559-89 (1996); Shigeru Kuriyama, HistoricalAspects of the Progress of
InternationalLaw in Japan, I JAP. ANN. INT'L L 1, 4 (1957).
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solidarity," and free trade. 6
The first attempts by NGOs to influence intergovernmental conferences
as a means of promoting their goals can also be dated back to the nineteenth
century. The example of the First Geneva Conference, proposed and
organized by the Red Cross, has already been mentioned. In addition, most
of the other major conferences in the nineteenth century, starting with the
Congress of Vienna in 1815 until the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899,
were attended by numerous nongovernmental organizations. 7 Governments
often used the preparatory work of private NGO conferences to formulate
multinational conventions, as in the areas of intellectual property protection
and international narcotic control.2
The Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919 established no formal
rules governing the relationship between the League of Nations and NGOs.
Rather, it referred in Article 25 only to the national organizations of the Red
Cross.29 In 1921, the League Council made an attempt to give Article 24,30
which addressed the relationship with other international organizations, a wide
interpretation in order to incorporate NGOs in this Article.3 However, the
Council reversed itself two years later and abandoned the idea of applying
Article 24 to NGOs because of expressed worries that the appearance of
official supervision could inhibit the activity of international NGOs.32
Although no formal rules existed, there was nevertheless an intensive
consultation process between international NGOs and the League of Nations

25. See Chamovitz, supra note 16, at 193-94; DAVID HUNTER MLLER, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
OF LABOR 7 (1921).

26. See Charnovitz, supranote 16, at 194.
27. Id. at 195-98.
28. Id. at 201-03; Simeon E. Baldwin, The InternationalCongresses and Conferences of the Last
Century as Forces Working Toward the Solidarity ofthe World, 1 AM. J. INT'L L 565, 576 (1907).
29. "The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation
of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations having as purposes the improvement of
health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world." LEAGUE OF
NATIONS COVENANT art. 25.

30. "There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaux already
established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent All such international bureaux and all
commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under
the direction ofthe League." Id. at art. 24, par. 1.
31. 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 759 (1921); see also Bertram Pickard, Article 24 ofthe League of
Nations andits Interpretation,7 INT'L ASs'N 576 (1955).
32. 4 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 858-59 (1923); Charnovitz, supranote 16, at 220; CHIANOPEI-HENo,
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AT THE UNIED NATIONS 37 (198 1).
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on a variety of activities.33 The establishment of a High Commissioner for
Russian Refugees in 1921 occurred because of an initiative by a consortium
34
of NGOs, including the International Federation of Trade Unions.
Furthermore, NGOs could speak in some committees of the League and could
propose resolutions and amendments. 35 NGOs were also given the opportunity
to consult government representatives at the World Disarmament Conference
in Geneva in 1932.36
Since the beginning of the 1930s, most NGOs suffered a setback in their
3
NGO
activities as a result of the world economic and political crisesY.
decades
the
first
politics
in
activities were further limited by Cold War
following the end of World War II.3' As one commentator pointed out, "the
United Nations took account of the nuisance value of NGOs rather than of
their positive nature." 39 However, NGOs were active during this period under
the United Nations framework especially in the promotion of the international
protection of human rights.' ° In addition, nuclear weapons offered a new area
for NGO activities, as a part of their general, and much older, engagement in
the international issue of disarmament.4
The involvement of NGOs in the international realm intensified in the
1970s and 1980s, when these entities began to grow in number, size, and
diversity.42 NGOs became to an increasing extent involved in the preparations
for international conferences,43 played a key role in stimulating new
international agreements-especially in the area of environmental
protection-and were incorporated in the monitoring of existing international

33. Klaus Hffner, Non-Governmental Organizations,in 2 UNTIED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND

PRACTICE 927, 928 (Ridiger Wolfrum & Christiane Philipp eds., 1995); Michael M. Gunter, Toward a
ConsultativeRelationshipBetween the UnitedNations andNon-Governmental Organizations?,10 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 557, 560 (1977); see also Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 221-37.
34. See 1/2 DAHM ET AL., VOLKERRECHT § 107 (2d ed. forthcoming); Macalister-Smith, supra note
16, at 484.
35. See Charnovitz, supranote 16, at 221-37.
36. Hilfner, supra note 33, at 928; Charnovitz, supranote 16, at 232; CHIANO, supra note 32, at 35.
37. Rechenberg, supranote 11, at 278; Hilfher, supra note 33, at 929.
38. See Charnovitz, supranote 16, at 258.
39. J. J. LADOR-LEDERER, INTERNATIONAL GROUP PROTECTION: AIMS AND METHODS IN HUMAN
RIGHTS 396 (1968).
40. See, e.g., Jane Connors, NGOs and the Human Rights of Women at the UnitedNations, in THE
CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD: THE INFLUENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE UN
SYSTEM 147-80 (Peter Willetts ed., 1996); Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 258-61.
41. Charnovitz, supranote 16, at 261.
42. Id. at 261-65.
43. See Rainer Lagoni, Article 71, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 902, 910-11 (Bruno
Simma et al. eds., 1994).
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regimes. The idea of transnational relations on a nongovernmental level
reached a new climax which led to a significant increase in both the number
and the influence of NGOs.
This short overview of the history and evolution of NGOs as actors in the
international realm demonstrates, on one side, that NGOs are not an entirely
new phenomenon. On the other side, it raises the question whether, in the
light of their increasing influence in recent years, their international legal
status should be examined.
II. REASONS FOR THE GROWING PARTICIPATION
OF NGOs ININTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A variety of reasons exist why NGOs, in recent years, have gained more
influence in international relations and are more active in global policymaking
than ever before." Among the most important ones are the processes of
globalization.
Globalization is commonly defined as the "denationalization of clusters
of political, economic, and social activities"'45 that undermine the ability of the
sovereign State to control activities on its territory,' due to the growing need
to find solutions for global problems, like the pollution of the environment, on
an international level. In connection with these processes, non-State actors,
like Greenpeace or Amnesty International, become global "pressure groups"
that act on behalf of the public interest.'
The processes of globalization, especially the recognition of global
problems, have led to more negotiations and decisions on the international

44. For an analysis of these reasons, see e.g., Chamovitz, supra note 16, at 265-68; Kjell Skjelsbaek,
The Growth ofInternational Nongovernmental Organization inthe Twentieth Century, 25 INT'L ORG. 420
(1971).
45. Jost Delbrlck, Globalizationof Law, Politics, and Markets-Implicationsfor Domestic Law-A
EuropeanPerspective, 1 IND. J.GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 10-11 (1993) (emphasis omitted).
46. David P. Fidler, The Globalization of Public Health: Emerging Infectious Diseases and
InternationalRelations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 14 (1997); see also Gordon 1.Walker & Mark
A. Fox, Globalization:An Analytical Framework, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 375, 380 (1996);
Jonathan Fried, GlobalizationandInternationalLaw-SomeThoughtsfor States and Citizens,23 QUEEN'S
L.J. 259, 267 (1997).
47. Peter Willetts, The Impact ofPromotionalPressure Groups on Global Politics, in PRESSURE
GROUPS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM: THE TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS OF IsSUE-ORIENTED NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 179 (Peter Willetts ed., 1982); see also Roberto Socini Leyendecker,
OrganisationsNon-Gouvernementales et Droit International,2 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 169, 174 (1989);
DOMINIQUE CARREAU, DROrr INTERNATIONAL 30 (4th ed 1994).
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level that also strongly affect domestic policy and legislation. 48 In fact, many
former nationally-oriented NGOs have had to transnationalize in order to keep
their status as pressure groups on the international as well as the domestic
decisionmaking level.49
Another important aspect ofthe growing integration of the world economy
is the denationalization of an increasing number of multinational corporations.
These entities view the world, rather than their home States, as the basis for
their operations and are able to evade the constraints of national regulatory
mechanisms by moving their productions between their different operational
bases all over the world.'
Thus, the global activities of multinational
corporations also force private actors like trade unions, consumer groups, and
environmental organizations, which have traditionally communicated with
business corporations on a national level, to become internationally active in
order to retain their influence and restraints on the corporations."
Other reasons for the growing influence of international NGOs can, at
least in a broader sense, also be related to the processes of globalization. 2
First, the new developments in telecommunications and information
technologies have made global communications among private individuals

48. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reforms: Rejection,
Relocation, or Reinvention ?, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 440-64 (1995); see also ALFRED C.
AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW INA GLOBAL ERA 131-56 (1992).
49. For an analysis on the connection between the increasing number of non-State actors in the
international system and the processes of globalization, see Delbrtlck, supranote 4, at 278 n.2.
50. Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-Centered
TransnationalLegal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L & PoL'Y 1, 8 (1993); Louis W. Pauly & Simon Reich,
National Structures and Multinational Corporate Behavior: Enduring Differences in the Age of
Globalization, 51 INT'L ORG. 1, 2 (1997). For a look on the problems resulting from this phenomenon, see
Joshua P. Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, EnvironmentalRegulation of TransnationalCorporations,and
the Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT'L L J. 261,304-05 (1997); see also Mark Gibney
& R. David Emerick, The ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Law and the ProtectionofHuman
Rights: HoldingMultinationalCorporationsto Domestic and InternationalStandards, 10 TEMP. INT'L
& COM. LJ. 123, 144-45 (1996).
51. See Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 50, at 8; Peter Malanczuk, Globalization and the Future
Role of the Sovereign States, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WiTH A HUMAN FACE 45, 57-58 (Friedl
Weiss et al. eds., 1998).
52. Although the definition mentioned in the second paragraph of Part IU is generally applicable to
characterize globalization, many scholars have pointed out that the word "globalization" can have various
meanings in different contexts, and can describe a number of different phenomena. See, e.g., Alfred C.
Aman, Jr., An Introduction, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (1993); Fidler, supra note 46, at 14 n.5;
Benedict Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, the World Trade Organization, and the Liberal
Project to Reconceptualize International Law, 5 Y.B. INT'L ENvrL. L. 1, 4 (1994); Alberto Tita,
Globalization:A New Politicaland EconomicSpace RequiringSupranationalGovernance,32 J. WORLD
TRADE 47,49 (1998).
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much easier and faster than before. These developments made possible a
continuing international dialogue over e-mail networks between scholars and
people who share the same interests.53 New information technologies also
enable activists in local human rights NGOs to inform organizations all over
the world of developments in their countries in a very sh6rt period of time.M
The impact of this development is further strengthened through the creation
of worldwide media companies like CNN International, which provide NGOs
with an opportunity to explain their views to a worldwide audience.5
As a result of these processes, the world has become in the last decades
more integrated, which some people believe has led to a growing "general
awareness of the interconnectedness of human beings.' '5 This general
awareness finds expression, for example, in the increasing attention paid to the
protection of the environment, which resulted in the creation of a new and
expanding branch of international law.57 Furthermore, a growing interest can
be located not only at the intergovernmental level, 5s but also at the non-State
level, in the human rights violations caused by local conflicts such as civil
wars within States, which in the traditional view directly affect only the
internal peace of sovereign States.

53. Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 50, at 11; see also ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS
111 (1991); Peter Penthaler, Die Globalisierung als Herausforderung an eine Moderne Staatslehre, in
FESTSCHRIFr FUR FREDRICH KOA 69, 70 (Heinz Schafer et al.
eds., 1998) (calling the new information
technologies "the basis of globalization"). For a discussion on the use of modem information technology
by environmental NGOs, like Greenpeace, to enhance the effectiveness of their activities, see Jeffrey L
Dunoff, From Green to Global: Towards the Transformation of International Environmental Law, 19
HARv. ENVTL. L REV. 241,295-301 (1995).
54. See Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 50, at 11. For a look at the positive impact of the
telecommunications revolution, and also possible problems resulting from the use of this technology by
NGOs in other areas of increasingly global concern, like international health law, see David P. Fidler,
Mission Impossible? InternationalLaw and Infectious Diseases, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. UJ.493,501-02
(1996); David P. Fidler, Return ofthe Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases and International
Law, 81 MINN. L REV. 771, 854-55 (1997).
55. Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 265-66.
56. Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 50, at 20.
57. For a discussion on the relatively "short history" of the development of international
environmental law, see PATRICIA W. BIRNE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 82-135 (1992); ALLENL. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWOFPOLLuIION 3-30 (1983).
58. For a review of the extensive literature on this issue, see generally Jost Delbrfck, A Fresh Look
at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority ofthe United Nations, 67 IND. LJ. 887 (1992); Anne
Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions After the Cold War, 38 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 443 (1997); Lois E. Fielding, Taking a Closer Look at Threats to Peace: The Power of the
Security Council to Address Humanitarian Crises, 73 U. DET. MERCYLI REV. 551 (1996); Ruth Gordon,
United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond, 15 MICE. J. INT'L L 519
(1994).
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All these developments have led to increasing activity by private actors on
the international scene, which finds its most notable reflection in the
increasingly important role that NGOs play in the international system
generally and international law specifically. Diplomacy and international
negotiations, which have even in liberal democracies been traditionally
associated with a higher level of confidentiality and secrecy compared to
domestic politics, 9 are increasingly confronted with raised expectations about
their transparency and the opportunity they provide for public participation
through, inter alia, international NGOs.s
The growing importance of NGOs in current international relations can
thus be explained by a number of different factors that have caused an
increasing feeling of interdependence among national civil societies and a
growing sense of solidarity in the need for pursuing the public interest on the
global level.
III. THE INCREASING INFLUENCE OF NGOs IN THE CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM-ADANTAGES AND PROBLEMS

Today, NGO activities encompass virtually every area of international
concern.' Although a large number of influential NGOs are concerned with
the protection of the environment, such as Greenpeace, and the observance of
international human rights, such as Amnesty International, NGOs are also
active in the legal and judicial fields, as evidenced by the work of the Institut
de Droit International 2 and the International Commission of Jurists. 3
Furthermore, in the political sector, several institutions are working for the

59. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are ForeignAffairsDifferent?, 106 HARV.L REV. 1980
(1993) (discussing the different nature of foreign politics in the United States from a legal perspective); see
also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,315 (1936).
60. See, e.g., David A. Wirth, PublicParticipationin InternationalProcesses: Environmental Case
Studies at the NationalandInternationalLevels, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVrL. L & POL'Y 1, 1-5 (1996).
61. For a detailed overview, see Rechenberg, supra note 11, at 276-78; 1/2 DAHM Er AL., supra note
34, § 107.
62. See, e.g., Paul de Visscher, La Contributionde L "Institutde DroitInternationala la Protection
des Droits de L 7Homme, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU SERVICE DE LA PAMXDE LA JUSTICE ET DU
DEVELOPPEMENT-MELANGES MICHEL VIRALLY 215 (A. Pedone et al. eds., 1991).
63. See Howard Tolley, Jr., PopularSovereignty and InternationalLaw: ICJ Strategiesfor Human
Rights Standard Setting, 11 HUM. RTs. Q. 561 (1989).
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promotion of international peace, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union" and
the World Peace Council.65 For example, other NGOs are working in the
fields of labor, religion, education, and the promotion of women's rights."
The activities of NGOs in contemporary international law can be divided
into two different kinds of fields: their participation in the international
decisionmaking process concerning the codification and progressive
development of international law, and their activities in the enforcement of
international law and the promotion of the public interest.67 Aside from these
functions, there is also the International Olympic Committee, which has
created a legal order independent from State jurisdiction.
The following sections provide an overview of these different kinds of
NGO activities in current international law. Based on this analysis, it
discusses the need for a legal framework regulating NGO activities under
international law as well as the possible advantages of such legal rules for
these entities. Furthermore, it evaluates the question of legitimacy in
connection with the role of NGOs in global governance.
A. The ParticipationofNGOs in the InternationalDecisionmakingProcess
From a quantitative, as well as from a qualitative, point of view, the main

function of NGOs in the contemporary international system involves their
participation in the international decisionmaking process. This process can be
defined as the cooperation and diplomacy between the different, mainly
governmental, actors on the international level to find solutions for global
problems and to develop further and strengthen existing international law. It
consists of the development of policy as well as the transformation of

64. See H.H. Klein & W. Lauf, Inter-ParliamentaryUnion, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1016 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1996).
65. Rechenberg, supra note 11, at 277.
66. For a recent description of the activities of women's NGOs, see Wendy Schoener, Note, NonGovernmental Organizations and Global Activism: Legal and Informal Approaches, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEoAL STUD. 537, 555-58 (1997); Martha Alter Chen, Engendering World Conferences: The
International Women's Movement and the UN, in NGOs, THE UN, AND'GLOBAL GoVERNANCE 139
(Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds., 1996).
67. For the current debate about public interest norms in international law, see Eibe Riedel,
InternationalEnvironmentalLaw-A Law to Serve the PublicInterest? An Analysis of the Scope ofthe
Binding Effect of Basic Principles,in NEW TRNDS ININTERNATIONAL LAWMAKIN--INTERNATIONAL
"LEGISLATION" IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 61, 89-97 (Jost Delbrkck ed., 1997) [hereinafter NEW TRENDS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING]; Bernard H. Oxman, The InternationalCommons, the InternationalPublic
InterestandNew Modes of InternationalLawmaking, in id. at 21, 21-60.
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international policies into norms of international law.
The following section, describes the various ways NGOs participate in the
international decisionmaking process. In addition, it will evaluate the need for
a legal framework in the form of an international agreement'governing NGO

activities in connection with this process.
1. The Activities of NGOs in the InternationalDecisionmakingProcess
NGOs are taking part in the international decisionmaking process in many
different ways. They are contributing to the progressive development of
international law by proposing new international conventions and by
participating in the negotiation and drafting of treaties in a variety of areas.
In the field of international environmental law, these non-State actors were
involved, for example, in the preparation of the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species, the World Heritage Convention, and the
Furthermore, NGOs played an
Convention on Biological Diversity."
important role in the negotiations that led to the adoption of the
Desertification Convention.69 NGOs have also contributed to the international
protection of human rights 0 in connection with the United Nations
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment and Punishment 7' and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.'
NGOs are especially active in the progressive development of
international humanitarian law. A recent example of these activities is the

68. Kal Raustiala, The "ParticipatoryRevolution " in InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 21 HARV.
ENVTL. L REV. 537, 559 (1997); John McCormick, InternationalNongovernmental Organizations:
Prospectsfor a Global EnvironmentalMovement, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLIICS IN THE NTERNATIONAL
ARENA 135 (Dinah Sheldon et al. eds., 1993).
69. Convention to CombatDesertificationin those CountriesExperiencingSeriousDroughtand/or
Desertification,Particularlyin Africa, U.N. Doc. A/AC 241/15/Rev. 7, reprintedin 33 LLM. 1328 (1994);
see also Kyle W. Danish, Note, InternationalEnvironmental Law and the "Bottom-Up" Approach: A
Review of the DesertificationConvention, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 133, 162-64 (1995).
70. On the role of NGOs in the drafting of conventions in this field, see generally Andrea Bianchi,
GlobalizationofHuman Rights. The Role ofNon-State Actors, in GLOBAL LAW WrOTIou A STATE 179,
186 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); Theo van Boven, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizationsin
InternationalHumanRights Standard-Setting:A PrerequisiteofDemocracy,CAL. W. INT'LL J. 207,21820(1990).
71. Kathryn Sikkink, Nongovernmental Organizations and Transnational Issue Networks in
InternationalPolitics,in 89 ASIL PRocEEDINoS 413, 414 (1995).
72. Cynthia Price Cohen, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Drafting of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 137, 139-47 (1990); Maja Kirilova Eriksson, The
Legal Position of the Unborn Child in InternationalLaw, 36 GERM. Y.B. INT'L L 86, 96,116 (1993).
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international discourse over the prohibition of anti-personnel mines,' a
development which was strongly promoted by international NGOs,74 and
which led to the adoption of a new international convention in the area of
international humanitarian law." Another example is the recent effort of the
Red Cross to ban the production and use of tactical laser weapons under
international law.7" Furthermore, NGOs are actively participating in the
progressive development and codification of international law in other areas
of growing international concern like the international law of development 7
and international law on bioethics.1
In the course of international negotiations, NGOs often correct potential
mistakes by pointing out logical or procedural inconsistencies in proposals of
new conventions under consideration.79 By providing factual background
information and evaluations, often unknown to government representatives,
and introducing new conceptual ideas to the negotiations, the participation of
NGOs also diminishes costs to governments while at the same time improving

73. See Michael J. Mathesona, The Revision of the Mines Protocol,91 AM. J. INT'L L. 158 (1997);
Kenneth Anderson & Monica Schurtman, The UnitedNations Response to the Crisis ofLandmines in the
Developing World, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 359 (1995).
74. See, e.g., the resolution on the "Worldwide ban on anti-personnel mines and the need for mine
clearance for humanitarian purposes," adopted by the Interparliamentary Union on September 20, 1996,
U.N. Doc. A/51/675 (1996); see also Janet E. Lord, Legal Restraints in the Use of Landmines:
Humanitarianand EnvironmentalCrisis, 25 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 311,350 (1995).
75. See Convention on the Prohibitionof the Use, Stockpiling, Productionand Transfer ofAntiPersonnelMinesand on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, supra note 2. As of October 20, 1998, the new
convention was signed by 131 states, and ratified by 47 countries <http'//www.icre.ch/unicc/icrenews>.
The Convention entered into force on 1 March 1999 in accordance with its Article 17. The efforts of NGOs
in the preparation of the convention is expressly acknowledged by the State parties in the preamble of the
Convention.
76. Louise Doswald-Beck, New Protocolon BlindingLaser Weapons, INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS
272 (1996); Burus M. Camahan, Unnecessary Suffering, the Red Cross and Tactical Laser Weapons, 18
LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 705 (1996). See also the recent Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons of
Oct. 13, 1995, to the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effect, reprinted in
INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 299 (1996).
77. See, e.g., IVES BEJOBEDER, LE ROLE INTERNATIONAL DES OROAISATIONS NON
GOUVERNEMENTALES 38-46 (1992); Brigitte Jessen, Von der Fremdsteuerungzur Selbststeuerung-NGOs
in der Entwicklungstheorie und-politik,X Dm FRrEDENsWARTE 141 (1996); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The
World Bank andNon-GovernmentalOrganizations,25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 623 (1992); Peter J. Illig, The
Role of Non-Government Organizationsin the Development of Environmental Policy at the Asian
DevelopmentBank, 1 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 47 (1994).
78. See Sonia Le Bris et al., InternationalBioethics, Human Genetics, and Normativity, 33 Hous.
L. REV. 1363, 1371-74 (1997).
79. Raustiala, supra note 68, at 559.
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the range of available policy alternatives.'
In addition, NGOs sometimes even serve as members of official State
delegations, especially in environmental treaty negotiations.
In the
deliberations prior to the Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty and
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the London
Centre for International Environmental Law was a member of the delegation
of the Alliance of Small Island States."' This development is also reflected by
the appeal of the 1994 Conference on Population and Development in Cairo
for governments to include NGOs in their delegations to conferences where
issues on population and development are discussed.'
NGOs are also playing increasingly important roles in direct negotiations
with governments on international issues. In September 1995, five NGOs
active in the field of environmental protection entered into negotiations with
the government of Mexico concerning the possibility of a new convention on
the protection of dolphins during tuna fishing.' These negotiations led to a
declaration by twelve nations, among them the United States, calling for a
binding international agreement on this issue.' In addition, the Worldwide
Fund for Nature was able to reach an agreement with Finland and a national
forestry company on recommencement of logging operations in the Karelian
Forest of Russia. 5
Furthermore, in all the main international conferences in recent years, like
the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio
de Janeiro, the 1994 Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, as
well as the 1995 World Women's Conference in Beijing, one can observe

80. Id. at 560. See also Myres S. McDougal et al., The World ConstitutiveProcess ofAuthoritative
Decision-Making, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 191, 269-72 (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reismnan eds., 1981).
81. Michael J. Kelly, Overcoming Obstacles to the Effective Implementation of International
Environmental Agreements, 9 GEO. INT'L ENvrL. L REV. 447, 487 (1997); Edith Brown Weiss,
InternationalEnvironmentalLaw: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order,81
GEO. LJ. 675, 693-94 (1993). For other cases of NGO participation in State delegations, see ABRAM
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREGNTY--COMPLANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 260-62 (1995).
82. Report ofthe InternationalConference on PopulationandDevelopment,para. 15.12, U. N. Doc.
A/CONF.171/13/Rev. 1 (1995); see also Charnovitz, supranote 16, at 281.
83. See Steve Charnovitz, Participationof Nongovernmental Organizationsin the World Trade
Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L 331,337 (1996).
84. See MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1995 107 (1996);
Charnovitz, supra note 83, at 337.
85. Charnovitz, supranote 83, at 337.
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increasing NGO participation.s" This fact is especially worth mentioning
because these international conferences are increasingly important in the light
of new developments in the international lawmaking process.' As Jonathan
Charney pointed out, major developments in international law today often get
their start or substantial support from resolutions and reports that are adopted
and discussed in these fora where representatives of States and other interest
groups come together to address important international problems of mutual
concern. 8
Finally, NGOs are also influencing the international
decisionmaking process through their participatory rights, connected with the
consultative status that many NGOs hold in a number of international
governmental organizations.89
However, NGO participation in intergovernmental organizations, official
negotiations, conferences, and international treaty regimes reflects only one
part of the influence of these non-State actors in the international
decisionmaking process. Often the "informal" strategies" used by NGOs to
promote their goals are even more important and successful. Besides
mobilizing public pressure on governments and providing expert support for
international lawmaking, NGOs are also starting direct personal appeals to,
and are in contact with, responsible decisionmakers in international

86. See Patricia Waak, Shapinga SustainablePlanet:The Role ofNon-GovernmentalOrganizations,
6 COLO. J. INT'L ENVn. L & POL'Y 345 (1995); Catherine Tinker, The Role of Non-State Actors in
InternationalLaw-MakingDuring
the UNDecade ofInternationalLaw,in ASIL PROCEEDINGS, supranote
71 at 171, 179.
87. See Jonathan L Charney, UniversalInternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L 529, 543-50 (1993);
Jost Delbrack, The Impact of the Allocation of International Law Enforcement Authority on the
InternationalLegal Order, in ALLoCATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT INTHE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 135,
149-51 (Jost Delbralck ed., 1995); Christian Tomuschat, The Concluding Documents of World Order
Conferences, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAWAT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 2 IsT CENTURY-ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF KRYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI 563 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996). For a related position, see also
Hiram Chodosh, Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence ofDeclarativeInternationalLaw, 26 TEX
INT'L UJ. 87, 120 (1991). For an analysis of these developments in the formation of customary
international law, see David P. Fidler, Challengingthe ClassicalConcept ofCustom: Perspectives on the
FutureofCustomary InternationalLaw, 39 GERM. Y.B. INT'L L 198,217-18 (1996).
88. Chamey, supra note 87, at 544; see also Jonathan I. Charney, InternationalLawmaking-Article
38 ofthe ICJ StatuteReconsidered,in NEW TRENDS ININTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING, supranote 67 at 171.
89. The participatory rights of NOOs in international organizations will be discussed in more detail
infra Part VI.B.2.a.
90. For the differences between the "formal" and "informal" strategies in the work of NOs, see
Schoener, supra note 66, at 540.
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organizations as well as in national governments. 9' They are thereby indirectly
influencing the behavior of States in the international system.
Because NGOs are not yet recognized as active participants in the normcreating process of customary international law,' their activities and
statements cannot be regarded as State practice and opiniojurisin the sense
of Article 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice."
However, they are nevertheless influencing, through their participation in the
international decisionmaking process and through their informal strategies
within States and international organizations, the behavior of States and of
international organizations. Therefore NGOs participate at least indirectly in
the norm-creating process of customary international law. This development
is also reflected by a number of international legal scholars who highlight the
growing importance of non-State actors, such as individuals and NGOs, in the
norm-creating process of customary international law, especially in the areas
of human rights and environmental protection.94
2. The Need for an InternationalLegal Framework Governing NGO
Activities
An international legal framework in the form of an international
agreement that lists the rights and duties for NGOs would further strengthen
their position in international decisionmaking by securing their independence
from State governments. By securing participatory rights in international
lawmaking fora and institutions and thus providing a legal basis for the
important contribution of NGOs to these activities, broader public

91. For a description of the "informal strategies" of the International Commission of Jurists, see
Tolley, supra note 63, at 561; see also Ann Marie Clark, Non-Governmental Organizationsand their
Influence on InternationalSociety, 48 J. INT'L AFF. 507, 512-25 (1995).
92. See Fidler, supra note 87, at 240. For a more detailed discussion of this issue and proposals for
future changes, see Isabelle R Gunning, Modernizing Customary InternationalLaw: The Challenge of
Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 211,227-34 (1991).
93. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38, para. l(b). On the elements of
customary international law, see, for example, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G.
v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 20); see also Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of
America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176 (Aug. 27); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBUC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-9 (4th ed. 1990).
94. See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, Sources ofInternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 399 (1995);
Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 38 (1995); Fidler,

supra note 87, at 224-48. On the influence of non-State actors in the customary norm creating process in
the area of international labor law, see Jennifer L. Johnson, Public-Private-PublicConvergence: How the
PrivateActor Can Shape Public InternationalLabor Standards,24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 291 (1998).
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participation is no longer dependent on the "good will" of governments95
which, especially if they have a long history of oppression on the domestic
level, sometimes react with hostility toward this growing democratization of
interactions in the international system.'e
Because NGOs are gaining a more important role and influence in the
international decisionmaking process, there is also a growing need for keeping
these entities to internationally-recognized legal standards.7' An international
legal framework for NGOs would ensure that only those NGOs that show a
positive attitude toward the values of the international legal community
participate in the process of international governance. One could, for
example, exclude from international fora groups that are corrupt or have a
history of advocating, or still advocate, violent activities. Furthermore,
internationally-recognized NGOs could be obliged to be committed expressly
to international human rights standards and to nonviolent changes in order to
participate in international lawmaking procedures.9"
B. The Role ofNGOs in the Enforcement of InternationalLaw
NGOs are not only participating in the international decisionmaking
process, but they are also increasingly involved in the monitoring of State
compliance with international law. They are active in the implementation of
international conventions by holding national governments to their treaty

95. See David Scott Rubinton, Toward a Recognition of the Rights ofNon-States in International
EnvironmentalLaw, 9 PACE ENVTL. L REV. 475, 494 (1992).
96. See generally Michael H. Posner & Candy Whittome, The Status of Human Rights NGOs, 25
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 269, 272-90 (1994); Laurie S. Wiseberg, ProtectingHuman Rights Activists
and NGOs: What More Can be Done?, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 525 (1991); Laurie S. Wiseberg, Defending
Human Rights Defenders: The ImportanceofFreedom ofAssociationforHumanRights NGOs, in ESSAYS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 23 (International Centre for Human Rights and
Democratic Development ed., 1993).
97. For examples of situations where the participation of NGOs had a negative influence, caused by
the over-zeal or selfishness of some organizations, see CHAYES & HANDLER CHAYES, supra note 81, at 270.
98. See generally Martha L. Schweitz, NGO Participationin InternationalGovernance: The
Question of Legitimacy, 89 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L 415, 417 (1995). A possible exception from the
commitment to nonviolent changes could be considered for NGOs advocating for a right of revolution
against tyrannical governments. On the international legal implications of this issue, see W. Michael
Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing CharterArticle 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L 642
(1984); Oscar Schachter, Is There a Right to Overthrow an Illegitimate Regime?, in LE DROlT
INTERNATIONAL AU SERVICE DE LA PAMX, DE LA JUSTICE ET DU DAAVELOPPEMENT: MILANOES MICHEL
VIRALLY 423 (A. Pedone ed., 1991); Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use ofForce to Restore
Democracy: InternationalLegal Implicationsof the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U.
INT'L L REV. (forthcoming 1999).
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obligations under international law." Especially, but not exclusively, in the
areas of human rights and environmental protection, NGOs are investigating
and publicizing violations of international law by States, thus often forcing
governments to comply with internationally-recognized standards. °0
In addition, NGOs are actively promoting the protection of human rights
in areas beyond State control. A telling example is the important role that
NGOs play in the battle against child pornography on the Internet.'
Furthermore, NGOs are playing an active role in the field of conflict
prevention and conflict resolution all over the world,"° as well as in
international election observing"- 3 -activities which have become more and
more important in the post-Cold War period.
However, this participation in monitoring State compliance with
international law, most of it integrated in international treaty regimes, is only
one aspect of NGO activities in this area. Even more important in this
connection are the often widely recognized actions undertaken by powerful
environmental protection groups like Greenpeace in order to pursue their
goals. Such organizations even breach the law to force national governments
or transnational corporations to comply with their demands in the enforcement
of a self-claimed international mandate for the protection of the

99. See, e.g., Stuart N. Hart & Laura Thetaz-Bergman, The Role ofNongovernmental Organizations
in Implementing the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 6 TRANSNAT'L L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 373,
375 (1996).
100. See David S. Ardia, Does the EmperorHave No Clothes? Enforcement of InternationalLaws
Protectingthe MarineEnvironment, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 497, 559-63 (1998); David Weissbrodt, The Role
ofInternationalNongovernmentalOrganizationsin the Implementation ofHuman Rights, 12 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 293 (1977); Maria Garner, TransnationalAlignment ofNongovernmental Organizationsfor Global
EnvironmentalAction, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 1057, 1072-84 (1991); James Gathii & Celestine
Nyamu, Reflections on United States-BasedHuman Rights NGOs' Work on Africa, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 285 (1996).
101.For a detailed description of the role of NGOs in this area, see Jennifer Stewart, If this Is the
Global Community. We Must Be on the Bad Side of Town: InternationalPolicing of ChildPornography
on the Internet, 20 HOus. J. INT'L L. 205, 234 (1997).
102. See Farouk Mawlawi, New Conflicts, New Challenges: The Evolving Role for NonGovernmental Actors, 46 J. INT'L AFF. 391 (1993); Felice D. Gaer, Ethnic Conflict and Preventive
Diplomacy: New Challenges for International Organizations, Nation-States and Nongovernmental
Organizations,88 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'LL 146, 151 (1994); Thomas G. Weiss, The UN's PreventionPipeDream, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L 423, 431 (1996). For a specific example of the work of an international
NGO's work in this field, see Robert Kogod Goldman, InternationalHumanitarianLaw: Americas
Watch's Experience in Monitoring InternalArmedConflicts, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 49 (1993).
103. See Karen J. Jason, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in InternationalElection
Observing, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1795 (1992).
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environment."' 4 An instructive example in this respect is the Brent Spar
episode, where Greenpeace forced Shell to refrain from scuttling an oil rig in
the North Sea. Even after analysis from independent experts showed minimal
risk for the environment, contrary to the erroneous information with which
Greenpeace was working, this organization continued its campaign with great
costs for Shell resulting from the launched boycott." 5 Thus, as Peter Spiro
pointed out, Greenpeace has, in effect, proposed and "enforced a new norm
of international environmental law."" ° Another example is the campaign
against the hunting of Canadian harp seals that resulted in dislocation for
indigenous groups in the area, despite the fact that there was no evidence that
the species was endangered." °
These examples demonstrate on one side, the influence of international
NGOs in the enforcement of international law. However, on the other side,
it also shows that the power of at least some of these entities might have to be
limited by an international legal framework in order to provide for some form
of accountability in cases of possible NGO irresponsibility.0 8
C. The IndependentLegal OrderoflnternationalSports Organizations-The
Jurisdictionof the IOC
Another example of the functions of NGOs in the contemporary
international system can be located in the area of international sports law. The
predominant organization in this area is the International Olympic Committee
(IOC), which "is the governing body for the Olympic Games and has final
authority on all questions and disputes that arise under the Games."'" This
transnational legal order in the area of sports established by the IOC also
includes an International Court of Arbitration for Sports set up in March 1983

104. See Hobe, supranote 5, at 198.
105. Spiro, supranote 8, at 964.
106.Id. at 965.
107. See Paul Wapner, PoliticsBeyond the State: EnvironmentalActivism and World Civic Politics,
47 WORLD PL. 311,325 & n.51 (1995).
108.See Delbrfck, supra note 4, at 295; Spiro, supra note 8, at 962; Zemanek, supra note 7, at 42.
109. David J. Ettinger, The Legal Status of the InternationalOlympic Committee, 1992 PACE Y.B.
INT'L L 97, 97; see also OLYMPIC CHARTER Rule 1, § 4 (1984). Because of the IOC's powerful position
in international sports law, it has been advocated in the legal literature that this organization is even
substantially participating in the creation of customary international law in this area of international
concern. See JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 34-35 (1988); Paul Mastrocola, The
Lords of the Rings: The Role of Olympic Site Selection as a Weapon Against Human Rights Abuses:
China'sBidfor the 2000 Olympics, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 141, 147-48 (1995).
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by the IOC."'
By State submission to the regulations established by the IOC, an
international non-governmental organization,"' and to the subsequent
sanctions for violating these rules,"' "State practice appears to accept the
relative autonomy of the legal order framed and executed by the IOC."' n 3 As

a result of this acceptance of the IOC's supremacy in the international sports
order, domestic courts usually refrain from granting legal protection against
punitive decisions of organs of the IOC, for example a prohibition from
participating in the Olympic Games." 4 However, taking into account the
growing professionalization of sports, such punitive acts can amount to a
denial of internationally recognized fundamental rights, like the freedom to
choose and exercise a profession." 5 In addition, there are questions whether
the Court of Arbitration for Sports fails to meet recognized international
standards of independence and impartiality,"6 and questions concerning the
nomination of members for and the decisionmaking process within the IOC
7
itself."
Thus, there is clearly a need for a strategy ensuring that this powerful and
independent organization, as a consequence of its recognized autonomy in the
international system, is also obliged to observe fundamental human rights in

110. See Adam Samuel & Richard Gearhart, Sporting Arbitration and the International Olympic
Committee's Court ofArbitration for Sport, 6 J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1989, at 39; Anthony T. Polvino,
Arbitration as Preventative Medicine for Olympic Ailments: The International Olympic Committee's
Court ofArbitration for Sport and the Future for the Settlement of International Sporting Disputes, 8
EMORY INT'L L REv. 347 (1994).

111. Christoph Vedder, The International Olympic Committee: An Advanced Non-Governmental
Organization and the International Law, 27 GERM.Y.B. INT'L L 233, 248 (1984); LYMAN CROMWELL
WHITE, INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS:

THEIR PURPOSES, METHODS, AND

ACCOMPUSHMENTS 199 (1968).
112. See, e.g., James A.R. Nafriger, Nonaggressive Sanctions in the International Sports Arena, 15
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 329 (1983).
113. Hobe, supra note 5, at 197. See also Barbara A. O'Neill, International Sports: Have States
Succeeded Athletes as the Players?, 6 DICK. J. INT'L L 403, 424 (1988); Mastrocola, supra note 109, at
150.
114.See Jeffrey M. Marks, PoliticalAbuse of Olympic Sport, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL. 155
(1981); Marcia B. Nelson, Stuck Between Interlocking Rings: Efforts to Resolve the Conflicting Demands
Placed on Olympic National Governing Bodies, 26 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L 895, 907 (1993).
115. Hobe, supra note 5,at 197.
116. For some critical remarks on this institution, see Stephen A. Kaufinan, Issues in International
Sports Arbitration, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 527, 532-37 (1995); Ettinger, supra note 109, at 112-13.
117. See Ettinger, supra note 109, at 115-20; JOHN LUCAS, THE MODERN OLYMPIC GAMES 136-46
(1980).
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its conduct" in order to avoid an "extra-legal realm" in the international legal
community.
D. NGOs as Participantsin the InternationalSystem-The Dual Question of
Legitimacy
The concept of legitimacy provides an additional reason to create a legal
framework for the international activities of NGOs. The question of
legitimacy in international relations and international law, which in recent
years has gained increasing importance," 9 can also be regarded as a crucial
one for the participation of NGOs in international governance. It has been
pointed out frequently that the participation of NGOs in the international
decisionmaking process and monitoring the compliance of States with
international law serves "to reduce the 'democratic deficit' in international
law-making and implementation,"'20 and enhance the legitimacy of these
processes through broader public participation and the promotion of
transparency. 2 ' However, the question of legitimacy and NGO participation
in international governance is not exclusively related to the improvement of
transparency in the decisionmaking process of international law and policy.
Rather, it can be characterized as a dual issue, which also concerns the internal
structure of NGOs themselves.
As NGOs grow in number and become more sophisticated and better
connected to each other, they can expect not only more supporters within
governments but also more challenges to the legitimacy of their participation

118. For these reasons, it has been suggested in the international legal literature tha the IOC is bound
by the body of international human rights law. See NAFZIOER, supra note 109, at 81; Mastrocola, supra
note 109, at 158.
119. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the InternationalSystem, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705,
706-13 (1988); Obiora Chinedu Okafor, The Global Process ofLegitimation and the Legitimacy of Global
Governance, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L 117 (1997).
120. LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY & BRENT R. HENDRICKS, INERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
INANUTsHELL 411 (1997).
121.See, e.g., Kevin Stairs & Peter Taylor, Non-Governmental Organizations and the Legal
Protectionofthe Oceans: A Case Study, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 110, 134
(Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992) (noting that "[legitimacy of governmental
decisionmaking is enhanced by NGO participation."); David A. Wirth, Reexamining Decision-Making
Processes in InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 79 IOWA L. REV. 769, passim (1994).
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in the international decisionmaking process.'
The question of legitimation
can also become a crucial one for the internal organization of NGOs, since the
representation and democratic legitimacy of NGOs is not above scrutiny."'
With only some notable exceptions, such as Amnesty International and the
Sierra Club, very few international NGOs are operating on a democratic
basis.'24 Most NGO leaders, who are not elected by the members, enjoy broad
discretion concerning the policies to be pursued and with what level of
vigor. 125

Another issue in this regard is the usual predominance of Western NGOs,
which is especially criticized by developing countries.2 6 The claim made by
NGOs to enhance public participation in the international decisionmaking
process would be thus more credible if the participation of "Third World"
NGOs could be promoted. Thus, a legal framework for NGOs could also
enhance the legitimacy of these organizations and would, at least to a certain
extent, also strengthen the legitimacy of their claims to participate in the
process of global governance.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS AN
"OPEN SYSTEM UNDER THE RULE OF LAW"

A further reason for making NGOs legal subjects of international law,
with the consequence that these entities enjoy rights but also bear duties
toward the international community, could be based on the character of the
international system itself. If the contemporary international system could be
regarded as an international legal society, with the purpose of ensuring legal
certainty, accountability of its members, and international peace, one could
argue that NGOs also should be recognized as subjects under international law
because of their increasingly important and influential role in the international
legal realm.

122. Schweitz, supra note 98, at 417; see also Klaus Hflfner, Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs)im System der Vereinten Nationen, DIE FR EDENSWARTE 115, 119 (1996).
123.See Spiro, supra note 4, at 51; Hhfner, supranote 122, at 119.
124. Hflfner, supra note 122, at 119; Spiro, supranote 4, at 51-52.
125. Spiro, supra note 8, at 963.
126. See, e.g., CHAYES & HANDLER CHAYES, supra note 81, at 270.
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A. Anarchy or Legal Order: The Controversy Over the Characterof the
InternationalSystem
There is general agreement among international legal and international
relations scholars that States and other main actors in the international realm
presently form an international system, in the sense that the actors have
sufficient contact with each other and have sufficient impact on their decisions
to act as parts of a whole.' However, considerable dispute exists whether
this international system can already be regarded as an international society,
in which the main actors are "conscious of certain common interests and
common values," and thus form a society by conceiving "themselves to be
bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share
in the working of common institutions."' 12 While on the one side, an
international society presupposes the existence of interactions between units
in an international system. On the other side, an international system can also
be merely mechanical and thus does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the actors also form an international society governed by the rule of law. 9
The existence of an international legal order, as Hermann Mosler pointed
out, is based on the fulfillment of two prerequisites. First, the factual
observation of the parallel existence of self-governing sovereign units; and

127. On the definition of an international system, see Stanley Hoffmann, InternationalSystems and
InternationalLaw, in THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THEORETICAL ESSAYS 205, 207 (Klaus Knoerr &
Sidney Verba eds., 1961); see also I/l GEORO DAHM ET AL., VOLKERRECHT 3 (2d ed. 1989).
128. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STtUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 13 (1977).
From the same author, see Hedley Bull, The Emergence of a Universal InternationalSociety, in THE
EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 117 (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson eds., 1984); see also Fidler,
supra note 87, at 214-15. However, there is some disagreement among international legal scholars
concerning the meaning of the term "international society". See Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to
Community Interest in InternationalLaw, 250 RECUEIL DES COURS 217, 245 (1994) (using the term
"international community" to describe "a 'higher unity,' as it were, the representation and prioritization of
common interests as against the egoistic interests of individuals. A mere 'society' (Gesellschafl) on the
contrary, does not presuppose more than factual contacts among a number of individuals."); see also
Manfred Lachs, Quelques Rdflexions sur la Communaut6 Internationale,in M.LANGES MICHEL VIRALLY
349, 381 (A. Pedone ed., 1991); MARCEL M.T.A. BRUS, THIRD PARTY DISPUrE SELEmiENT IN AN
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD: DEVELOPING A THEORETICAL FRAmEWORK 128-53 (1995). An even stronger

criticism against the notion of "international society" as defined above has been given by Philip Allott, who
regards it as a misconceived conception being undemocratic and unsocialized, and thus insufficient to
create a valuable legal system. See PHILIP ALLOTr, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 244-57

(1990); Philip Allott, The TrueFunction ofLaw in the InternationalCommunity, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 391,411 (1998).

129. See BULL, supranote 12 8, at 13-14; see also David P. Fidler, CompetitionLaw andInternational
Relations,41 INT'L & COMP. LQ. 563, 583 (1992).
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second, the creation by, and awareness of, these units of legal rules which
substitute for the nonexistent common superior authority. 13
The factual criterion is related to the existence of an intertational system,
as described above, and can be regarded as being fulfilled with the "birth" of
the modem interstate system, commonly connected with the Peace Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648. M However, the second criterion requires a more
extensive analysis of contemporary international relations.
It is beyond the scope and purpose of this Article to engage in a
comprehensive discussion about the legal nature of international law and the
international system. I" However, in the following sections, the main positions
will be at least briefly described and critically analyzed in order to determine
whether the character of the international system requires a legal integration
of influential non-State actors like NGOs.
1. The Realist Perspective: Struggle for Power in an Anarchical
InternationalSystem
The school of thought most critical of the concept of an international
society is commonly called "realism." This approach became the dominant
mode for understanding international relations following the end of World
War II, 1 3 although the roots of its classical form can be traced back as far as

130. Hermann Mosler, The InternationalSociety as a Legal Community, 140 RECUEIL DES COURS
1, 19 (1974).
131. See, e.g., 1/1 DAHM ET AL., supra note 127, at 5; Richard A. Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia
and CharterConceptions ofInternationalLegal Order, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEaAL
ORDER: TRENDS AND PATTERNS 32, 43 (Richard A. Falk & Cyril E. Black eds., 1969); Antonio F. Perez,
Who Killed Sovereignty? Or: ChangingNorms Concerning Sovereignty in InternationalLaw, 14 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 463, 466 (1996). It has been pointed out by many scholars that this decisive date has to be
regarded in historical terms as being an oversimplification, see e.g., Schreuer, supra note 14, at 447.
Although this is probably correct, it is neither uncommon in the historical science to connect certain
historical developments with specific dates, nor does it deprive this approach of a certain value in
describing changes in the international system. As an example one might name the end of World War ,
which is commonly viewed as the end of the Eurocentric international system, despite the fact that on the
one side non-European powers like the United States, Japan and the Ottoman Empire played already before
that date a major role in world politics, and that on the other side, European powers like the United
Kingdom and France kept an extensive colonial empire for a considerable time after 1918.
132. For a comprehensive study on this fundamental issue, see, e.g., HERSCH LAUrERPACHT, THE
FUNcTIoN OF LAW IN THE INTERNATONAL COMMUNITY (1933); Mosler, supra note 130.
133.See Anthony Clark Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? InternationalLaw and International
Politics,38 VA. J. INT'L L 107, 110 (1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter, LiberalInternationalRelations Theory
and InternationalEconomicLaw, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 717, 721-22 (1995).
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the Greek philosopher and historian Thucydides.'-'
Despite the fact that the realist writers differ in their approaches to a
considerable extent, one can find certain core assumptions that are
characteristic of the realist understanding of the nature of the international
system."3 5 Realists see the international system as a competitive environment
in which States, as being the only relevant actors in the international realm,
struggle with each other for survival." In this anarchical international system,
with its inherent insecurity, States "think and act in terms of interest defined
as power"'37 to maximize their relative power over other States' to maintain
their position in the international system.'39
It follows from this characterization of the international system that realist
thinkers have generally denied any real independent force to societal bonds
between States in general and international law in particular. 40 Realists see
not an international society governed by the rule of law, but, as Reinhold
Niebuhr wrote, "an uneasy balance of power would seem to become the
highest goal to which society could aspire."14 However, in the eyes of
realists, even such a status is unlikely to be achieved. Rather, in light of the
continuing and growing emphasis on cultural diversity in the world following
the end of the Cold War, many realists see the political world as moving away
from a community and getting closer to global anarchy, which will inevitably
lead to a "clash of civilizations," as famously postulated by Samuel

134. Thucydides' work "The History of the Peloponnesian War," written in the 4th century B.C., is
commonly understood as being the first "realist" work in world history. See, e.g., David P. Fidler, War,
Law & Liberal Thought: The Use ofForce in theReaganYears, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L &COMP. L 45,72 n.150
(1994).
135. See, e.g., HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND

PEACE (5th ed. 1973).
136. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A
DualAgenda,87 AM. J. INT'L L.205,207 (1993); FERNANDO R. TES6N, APHILOSOPHYOF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 47 (1998).
137. MORGENTHAU, supra note 135, at 5.

138.See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of InternationalInstitutions, 19 INT'L
SECURITY 5, 11 (1994-1995).
139. KENNETH N. WALT7, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 126 (1979).
140. See THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 290 (W. Robert Connor ed. & Richard
Crawley trans., 1993) (stating that the Athenians say, in the Melian Dialoque, that right "is only in question
between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."); GEORGE
F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 95 (1984); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of"InternationalLaw",NAT'L
INTEREST 3, 10 (1989); see also Arend, supranote 133, at 114-15.
141. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY INETHICS AND POLITICS
232 (1932); see also Fidler, supranote 134, at 72.
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Huntington. 4 2 Thus realism regards international law as nothing more than
an ineffective moral code due to a lack of enforcement authority in the
international realm,'" which merely reflects and serves the interests of the
powerful and thus dominant States in the international system.'"
a) The Phenomenon of NGOs and the Realist Perspective
The realist theory focuses on the struggle of States for power in the
international system and views cooperation between States in
intergovernmental organizations as only another form of power politics, with
no or at least only marginal impact on the behavior of the international
actors.' 45 Since this approach is exclusively, or at least primarily, concerned
with the interactions of States in the international realm, the phenomenon of
the rise of influential non-State actors like multinational corporations and
NGOs is generally ignored in the writings of realist international relations
scholars.
However, from the realists' general conception of the international
system, one can draw two alternative conclusions about their view on nonState actors. First, since the realists regard States as being the sole important
actor in the international realm, they will probably downplay the role and
influence of non-State actors by referring to the importance of military power
for determining the influence of an actor in the international system," an area
in which States still, and for some time to come, will possess a monopoly,
basically unchallenged by non-State actors. 7 Second, even if realists
acknowledge the growing importance and influence of non-State actors like
NGOs, this fact would not lead them to the conclusion that NGOs should be

142. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash ofCivilizations?,FoREIGN AFF. Summer 1993, at 22, 22.
143. See, e.g., Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The State of War, in ROUSSEAU ON INTERATIONAL RELATIONS
33, 44 (Stanley Hoffmann & David P. Fidler eds., 1991) (stating that "As for what is commonly called
international law, because its laws lack any sanction, they are unquestionably mere illusions .....
144. ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD PoLrTIcs 35 (1981).
145. See Joseph M. Grieco,Anarchy and the Limits ofCooperation:A RealistCritiqueof the Newest
LiberalInstitutionalism,42 INT'L ORG. 485, 488 (1988); Susan Strange, Cave] HicDragones:A Critique
ofRegime Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 337,345 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). On the realist's
position concerning international organizations, see David P. Fidler, Caught Between Traditions: The
Security Council in PhilosophicalConundrum, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L 411,418-23 (1996).
146. On the importance of military capacity and its influence on the international system in the
realist's approach, see Mearsheimer, supra note 138, at 10.
147. A possible challenge in this area could emerge from international terrorism and organized crime.
See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implicationsfor InternationalLaw, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 7, 14-15 (1997).
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incorporated into an international legal system by making them subjects of
international law. Because of their disregard for international legal norms as
an effective factor in influencing the behavior of States, realists would deny
that an international legal status for NGOs would have a significant impact on
the position and behavior of States in the international system. Rather, realists
would merely view influential non-State actors like NGOs as a new category
of actors in international relations, that, besides States, pursue their interests
by participating in the power struggle inherent in an international system in
which the basic paradigms and patterns of behavior, leaving aside the growth
of international actors, remain the same. However, such an acknowledgment
of the importance of NGOs by realists is unlikely to happen because it would
lead to a fundamental shift in the realist paradigm and its entire framework for
understanding international relations.
b) The Deficits in the Realist Perspective
By stressing the decentralized nature of the international system and the
role of States as being the primary actors in the international realm, realism
reflects assumptions that are also consistent with the writings of most
international legal scholars.' 4 However, by offering "nothing but a naked
struggle for power which makes any kind of international society
impossible,"'49 realism as a theory of international relations is open to
criticism because of its failure to appreciate the contemporary international
system with all its diverse characteristics.
First, realism overlooks the fact that the decentralized nature of the
international system does not necessarily lead to insecurity of its actors and
a resulting struggle for power. Depending on the social consensus," 5 States
can also respond to the anarchical conditions in the international system

148. See Arend, supra note 133, at 116 (asserting that also most international legal scholars base their
description of the international system on these assumptions). See, e.g., I/1DAHM ET AL., supra note 127,
at 11; HANs KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 325-27 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945); SHAW,

supra note 20, at 5.
149. EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARs' CRIsIS 1919-1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 93 (2d ed. 1946); see also NIEBUHR, supranote 14 1, at 23 1; Fidler,

supra note 134, at 74.
150. The necessity of a social consensus among the actors in the international system as a precondition
for the formation of; and particularly the respect for, legal rules has been stressed by many scholars. See,
e.g., Simma, supranote 128, at 245; see generallyAlexander Wendt, ConstructingInternationalPolitics,
20 INT'L SECURITY 71, 77-78 (1995).
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through the creation of legal rules, thus providing a framework for their
interactions and the resolution of conflicts.'51
Second, realism assumes that States are acting in the international realm
This approach does not take
with predetermined identities and interests.
into account that States can also change their interests and "can become
different in nature through their participation in the international . .
system."' 53 As Anthony Clark Arend points out, "realists ask only if states
find it in their interest to follow legal rules and fail to consider the further
question of whether legal rules can change these interests by changing the very
identity of states."'' 4
Thus, realism as a theory of international relations is too narrow in its
scope to provide an approach capable of describing the nature of the
international system and answering the question of the possible existence of
an international legal society. This is also evidenced by new developments
within the realist tradition, which emphasize the significance of international
regimes and institutions on the behavior of States in the international
system.'55 This so-called "regime theory" argues that international institutions
can promote cooperation between States in the international realm, thereby
moving away from the traditional realist assumptions of power struggle as the
predominant characteristic of international relations.
2. The InternationalSystem as a Legal Community
However, even if the realist model, because of its narrow focus on the
power struggle between States with predetermined interests, is insufficient as
an approach to analyze the contemporary international system, it still remains
to be seen whether the the international system can indeed be characterized as
a legal community, or whether this term remains essentially "a tool of political

151.See Arend, supra note 133, at 116-17.
152.See, e.g., Ronald L. Jepperson et al., Norms, Identity, and Culture in NationalSecurity, in THE
CULTURE OF NATIONAL SEcURITY: NORMs AND IDENTrrY INWORLD POLITICS 33, 43 (Peter J. Katzenstein
ed., 1996); Arend, supra note 133, at 117.
153. Arend, supra note 133, at 117; see also Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It:
The Social ConstructionofPowerPolitics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391,405-07 (1992).
154.Arend, supra note 133, at 117.
155. See, e.g., Robert 0. Keohane, InternationalInstitutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT'L STUD. Q.
379 (1988); ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics, in
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POwER 1, 4 (1989); see also William J. Aceves, Institutionalist
Theory and InternationalLegal Scholarship, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227, 236-40 (1997).
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rhetoric."'Turning first to the school of natural law, one can observe that it has
always been a favorite idea of this school of thought to assume the existence
of an international community comprising all States, with certain preexisting
rights and duties for its members. 57 Early writers like Francisco de Vitoria,"
Francisco Sui.rez,'59 and Christian Wolff1 60 attempted to relate the existence
of an international society to the laws of nature. However, the idea of an
international society rooted in the the laws of nature, whose correctness was
more contended than proven,' was deeply influenced by religious beliefs of
the Christian tradition in a harmonious order that exists independently of any
human effort. The natural law approach is thus insufficient to describe the
contemporary international system which is characterized by cultural as well
as religious diversity and dominated by critical rationalism.'62
Therefore, if one accepts that the international system is "a man-made
construction"'' with its character determined by the behavior of its main
actors, one can agree with Louis Henkin that "almost all nations observe
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations
almost all of the time.""' Furthermore, it is notable that most of the content

156. Christian Tomuschat, ObligationsArisingforStates Without orAgainst Their Will, 241 RECUEIL
DES COURS 195, 232 (1993 IV); see also Helmut Freudenschull, Article 39 of the UN CharterRevisited:
Threats to the Peace in the Recent Practice of the UN Security Council, 46 AUS. J. PUB. INT'L L. 1, 2
(1993) (calling the term "international society" a "mythical beast").
157. See Tomuschat, supranote 156, at 232.
158. On Vitoria's concept of a world community, see Martin C. Ortega, Vitoria and the Universalist
Conception of International Relations, in CLASSICAL THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 99 (Ian
Clark & Iver B. Neumann eds., 1996); see also JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL

CONFLICT 9-11 (1954).
159. See James L. Brierly, Su6rez's Vision of a World Community, in THE BASIS OF OBLIGATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 358 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 1958).
160. CHRISTIAN WOLFF, Jus GENTIuM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM § 7 (1764) (cited in

Tomuschat, supra note 156, at 233 & nn. 74-75).
161. See CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 89 (P.E.
Corbett trans., rev. ed. 1968).
162. Tomuschat, supranote 156, at 234; see also JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAWOFNATIONS 44-45 (Sir

Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963).
163. Tomuschat, supra note 156, at 234; see also BRIERLY, supranote 162, at 45 (stating that "[wle
have begun to realize that a world society will not come into existence without conscious human effort.");
DE VISSCHER, supra note 161, at 100 (pointing out that "[tihe ultimate explanation of society as of law is
found beyond society, in individual consciences").
164. LOUIs HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis
omitted); see also THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A

NUTSHELL 9 (2d ed. 1990); PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 6 (1950). The existence of this
phenomenon is also conceded by some critics of international law, see MORGENTHAU, supra note 135, at
249 (stating that "to deny that international law exists as a system of binding legal rules flies in the face of
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of communications between States is based on legal terminology when they
seek to resolve international issues and disputes.'65 Only very rarely do States
justify their actions based on political or moral factors, whereas they
frequently make recourse to international legal principles. Although the fact
that States engage in an international legal discourse does not serve as the
ultimate proof for the existence of an international legal society,'66 it can at
least be seen as an indication that the main actors in the international system
regard legal rules as a legitimizing source on which their actions may be
based.
Furthermore, the mere fact that governments employ experts to provide
advice on matters of international law shows that States consider "that the
legal aspects must be carefully taken into account in the process of
decisionmaking. '"'67 States that do not comply with the recognized legal rules
of the international system open themselves up to often costly retaliatory
measures by other governments. I" Although a State may be from time to time
prepared to violate these rules in order to achieve a given political goal, the
fact that governments take international law into account can be regarded as
a clear indication that legal rules have a significant role in the interactions
between the units in the international system and are thus, at least to a certain
and often varying degree, effective.'69 Thus, the practices of States support the
assumption that legal rules are a part of what makes up the international
system. 7 In addition, as Thomas Buergenthal pointed out, it has to be taken
into account that "even the strongest states have long-term and short-term
political and economic interests in an international order in which conflicts are
resolved in accordance with generally accepted rules, in a manner that is

all the evidence").
165.See Anthony D'Amato, Is InternationalLaw Really "Law"?, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1293, 1301
(1984); Nigel Purvis, CriticalLegal Studies in Public InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 81, 110
(1991).
166.See D'Amato, supra note 165, at 1303. For the so-called "words versus action" problem in
connection with the creation of customary international law, see Fidler, supra note 87, at 202-03.
167. See Ian Brownlie, InternationalLaw at the Fiftieth Anniversaryofthe UnitedNations: General
Course on Public InternationalLaw, 255 RECuEUL DES CoORs 9, 35 (1995); JENNINGS & WATTS, supra
note 12, at 13; BUERGENTHAL & MAIER, supranote 164, at 9.
168. BUERGENTHAL & MAIER, supra note 164, at 12. This indication for the existence and at least
decentralized enforcement of legal rules in the international system corresponds to D'Amato's "reciprocal
entitlements" argument. See D'Amato, supra note 165, at 1303-13; SHAW, supranote 20, at 7.
169. See Brownlie, supranote 167, at 35.
170.Arend, supranote 133, at 130.
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reasonably predictable, and that reduces the likelihood of resort to force.' 17 1
By providing criteria for membership in the international system, and
determining when other legal rules will be binding, international law confers
legitimacy on the actors and gives normative value to their actions and
claims..' International law thus provides the rules for the identification of the
actors as well as for the interactions between the actors in the international
realm and is thus constitutive for the structure of the international system
174

itself.

However, the international system is not only a legal order in the sense
that the actors and their behavior are determined by international law. To an
increasing extent, international law also reflects common values shared by the
members of the international system and provides for rules to pursue common
interests of the international community as a whole. 75 This is evidenced by
the fact that States have built and are still in the process of building a
superstructure above and between them, consisting of international
organizations and multilateral treaty systems, which is increasingly replacing
the former system of merely bilateral contacts between the governments. 76
Furthermore, one can observe in the contemporary international system a
functional expansion of international legal rules." This is evidenced by both
a substantive extension of international law7 to areas like the protection of
human rights, international concern for the environment and a broadening in
scope of the concept of "international peace and security" to include internal

171.BUERGENTHAL & MAIER, supranote 164, at 12-13; see also M. Somarajah, Power and Justice
in InternationalLaw, 1 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 28, 68 (1997). On this argumentation, see Harold
Hongju Ko, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?,106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2634 (1997).
172. See generally Anthony C. Arend, Towards an Understandingof InternationalLegal Rules, in
INTERNATIONAL RULES 298-3 10 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996).
173. Arend, supranote 133, at 143-46,
174. See Stephen A. Kocs, Explaining the StrategicBehaviorofStates: InternationalLaw as System

Structure, 38 INT'L STUD. Q. 535, 538 (1994); INGRID DETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 30
(1994).
175.See JENNINGS & WATTS, supranote 12, at 11-16; John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations
of InternationalLaw: From State Consentto State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 433, 442-56 (1997).

176. Clive Parry, The Function of Law in the International Community in MANUAL OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 7 (Max Sorensen ed., 1968); Simma, supranote 128, at 229-55.

177. See Parry,supra note 176, at 43-47.
178. See, e.g., SHAW, supranote 20, at 36-41; Perkins, supranote 175, at 434.
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conflicts and threats to democratic governments." n The functional expansion
can also be seen in the change of the character and enforcement of
international legal norms. Through the concept of peremptory jus cogens
normsRIs and the enforcement of a number of legal rules erga omnes,'8 '
international law has developed a hierarchy of norms which expresses the
superiority of certain values that are regarded by the international community
as being fundamental."
In international relations theory, this normative vision of the international
system as a society sharing common values has been advocated by the liberal
tradition, which focuses on the liberty of the individual, democracy, and
importance of economic interdependence in the international realm, rather
than State power.a Liberal international relations theory also recognizes the
importance of non-State actors like NGOs and individuals to international

governance,"' thus providing in fact a more realistic view of the contemporary

179. This is most notably shown by the broadening of the concept of threat to international peace and
security under Article 39 of the Charter through Security Council actions. See, e.g., Final Declaration of
the Meeting of the Heads of State of the Members of the Security Council, Jan. 31, 1992, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3046, at 143 (1992); see also Delbrack, supra note 58, at 887-96; Peter H. Kooijmans, The
Enlargement of the Concept "Threat to the Peace", in PEAcE-KEEPING AND PEAcE-BUILDING: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE SECURrrY COUNCIL 111 (Rene-Jean Dupuy ed., 1992).
180. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 53, 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see
generally LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COaENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988);
Giorgio Gaja, Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention, 172 RECUEIL DES COURS 272 (1981). For a
critical view on the concept ofjus cogens, see Anthony D'Amato, It'sa Bird,It's a Plane,It's Jus Cogens,
6 CONN. J. INT'L L 1 (1990); A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept ofJus Cogens, as
Illustratedby the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICIL J.INT'L L 1 (1995).
181. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J.
3, 32 (Feb. 5); see also Antti Korkeakivi, Consequences of "Higher" InternationalLaw: Evaluating
Crimes of State and Erga Omnes, 2 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 81 (1996); MAURIZIO RAOAZZI, THE CONCEPT
OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONSE)IGA OMNES (1997).
182.See Jochen A. Frowein, Reactions by Not Directly Affected States to Breaches of Public
InternationalLaw,248 RECUEIL DES COURS 345,364 (1994); Prosper Weil, Towards RelativeNormativity
in InternationalLaw?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L 413, 432 (1983) (observing that the doctrines ofjus cogens and
erga omnes are "inspired by highly respectable ethical considerations.'). This development is furthermore
evidenced by Article 103 of the UN Charter, which declares, at least for the member States, the superior
nature of their obligations under the Charter, see also JENNINGS & WATTS, supranote 12, at 12.
183.See Fidler, supra note 87, at 236-37; Gerry J. Simpson, Imagined Consent: Democratic
Liberalismin InternationalLegalTheory, 15 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L 103,112-28 (1994); Brian F. Fitzgerald,
An EmergingLiberal Theory ofInternationalLaw and the Non-Enforcement ofForeignPublic Laws, 16
AUSTL Y.B. INT'L L 311 (1995).
184. See Fidler, supra note 87, at 241; Kenneth W. Abbott, "Economic" Issues and Political
Participation:The Evolving BoundariesofInternationalFederalism, 18 CARmOz L RBv. 971,998-1010
(1996); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internetas a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet's Role in
Strengthening National and Global Governance, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 423, 439-40 (1998);
David G. Post, The "Unsettled Paradox": The Internet,the State,and the Consentof the Governed, 5 IND.
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international system than the realists.
Although it has to be emphasized that the extent of common values shared
by the international community is heavily influenced and restricted by the
cultural, religious, and political diversity8 5 characteristics of the international
system after its transformation from a Eurocentric to a universal system,186
members of the contemporary international system share a sufficient number
of common values to be regarded as constituting an international society."
The character of international law, as closely related to international
politicsss is necessarily determined by the nature of the decentralized
international system in which it operates." 9 This effectively weakens the
expectations for compliance. 9 However, despite this fact, the analysis shows
that the international system can be characterized as being governed by
international legal rules, in the sense of the inherent significance of law as the
regulator of political action. 9'

J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 521,536 (1998).
185. See generallyNo-hyoung Park, The Third World as an InternationalLegal System, 7 B.C. THIRD
WORLD LJ. 37 (1987) (arguing that the Third World should be characterized as a single international
system); Sompong Sucharitkul, A Multi-DimensionalConcept ofHuman Rights in InternationalLaw, 62
NOTRE DAME I REV. 305 (1987). One example of how this diversity in the international system affects
the understanding of common values is the recent discussion about the relativity of human rights. See, e.g.,
Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUIM. HUM RTS. L REV. 1
(1997); Stephen J. Toope, CulturalDiversity and HumanRights, 42 McGILL L.J. 169 (1997).
186. On this development and its effects on the international system, see Mosler, supra note 130, at
26; Il DAHM ET AL., supra note 127, at 9.
187. See Gerald Filzmaurice, The FoundationsoftheAuthority oflnternationalLaw and theProblem
ofEnforcement, 19 MOD. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1956); 111DAHM ET AL., supranote 127, at 20-21; Tomuschat,
supra note 156, at 236.
188. 1/1 DAHM ET AL., supra note 127, at 1; SHAW, supranote 20, at 10.
189.See BRIERLY, supra note 162, at 41; Max Huber, Die Soziologischen Grundlagen des
V6lkerrechts,4 JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 56 (1910).
190. BUERGENTHAL & MAIER, supra note 164, at 12.

191. Mosler, supra note 130, at 32. See also Sir Geoffirey Howe, The Role ofInternationalLaw in
World Affairs, 33 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 739 (1984); Grigory I. Tunkin, Remarks on the Primacy of
InternationalLaw in Politics,in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU SERVICE DE LA PAIX, DE LA JUSTICE ET DU

DEVELOPPEMENT-MLANGES MICHEL VIRALLY 455 (A. Pedone et al. eds., 1991). However, it has been
pointed out by many international legal scholars that the full establishment of the international rule of law
is a continuing process. See Sir Arthur Watts, The InternationalRule ofLaw, 36 GERM. Y.B. INT'L L. 15,
44(1993).
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B. The Conceptofan "OpenInternationalSystem: " PromotingInternational
Society Through the Legal Integrationof NGOs into InternationalLaw
Since the international society can be characterized as a community
governed by the rule of law, it is the purpose of this society to pursue
international stability and avoid disputes"n and the arbitrary exercise of
power.'93 In order to promote these goals, the international legal order needs
to set the relations between all the main actors in the international system on
a legal basis in order to promote the "civilization" of international relations, 94
since a failure to bring the major international actors under the rule of law
imposes unnecessary risks on the inherently fragile international legal
system. 95 As Hermann Mosler pointed out, "the legal range of membership
must be determined according to the object and purpose of the society in
9
question.)"
The international society has, thus, to function as an "open system,"' 97
which possesses the flexibility necessary to conform to a dynamic
development of the international system by incorporating new, powerful nonState entities by making them subjects of international law'98 and providing for
a legal framework for their activities. The conception of an international
system as being capable of incorporating all the main actors on a legal basis
can be traced back to Immanuel Kant, who recognized that in order for a
global civil society to be the ultimate stage in the development of the
international system, it has to be a society under law to provide for the legal

192. See Jonathan I. Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement andInternationalLaw, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L 65, 81 (1997).
193.See Jost Delbralck, Peace Through Emerging InternationalLaw, in DiE KONSTrUrTON DES
FRIEDENS ALS REcHTSORDNUNO 275, 281-90 (Klaus Dicke et al. eds., 1996); Watts, supranote 191, at 25,
32; Mosler, supra note 130, at 31.
194.I/2 DAHM ET AL., supranote 34, § 108.
195.See Jonathan L Chamey, TransnationalCorporationsandDevelopingPubliclnternationalLaw,
DUKE IJ. 748, 754 (1983).
196. Mosler, supra note 130, at 48. See also Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 50, at 22.
197.See I/l DAHWET AL., supra note 127, at 30 (emphasizing the "open character" of the
contemporary international legal order). For a similar concept on the domestic level favoring an "Open
Republic", see Jost Delbrack, GlobalMigration-Immigration-Multiethnicity:Challenges to the Concept
of the Nation-State, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEoAL STuD. 45, 57-64 (1994) (stating a similar concept on the
domestic level favoring an "Open Republic").
198.ReparationsforInjuries Suffered in the Service ofthe UnitedNations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr.
11) ("Throughout its history, the development of international law has been influenced by the requirements
of intemational life...").
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constitutionalization of freedom. 1" As Jonathan Charney emphasizes, "the
continued viability of the international system depends upon the close
conformity of public international law to international realities." 0
This characterization of the international system as being open to new
actors to ensure the observance of the rule of law in international relations
shows the need for incorporating NGOs as new influential participants in
international relations.2"' Given the increasingly important role NGOs play in
international relations, it has become necessary to give NGOs international
legal status, thus binding them to international law to support the purposes of
the international legal order: legal certainty, accountability of the actors, and
international peace. Thus, the character of the contemporary international
system as an international society and the purposes of the international legal
order support the search for a legal construction to make NGOs subjects of
international law.
V. THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION

There are two possible legal constructions for binding NGOs under
international law that complement one another. First, NGOs can be regarded
as at least partial subjects of international law with not only rights but also
duties under the international legal system. A second possibility is the
creation of a "Code of Conduct" for NGOs in the form of an international
agreement.
In the following section, I discuss and evaluate both of these possible legal
constructions for limitations on the activities of NGOs under international law.
However, before the legal constructions can be evaluated, I first give an
199.See IMMANUEL KANT, ETERNAL PEACE 81-86 (Edwin D. Mead ed., 1914) (stating Kant's
explanation to his Second Definitive Article); see also Jost Delbrflck, "Das V6lkerrecht soil auf einen
FderalismfreierStaaten gegrindetsein"--Kant und die Entwicklung internationalerOrganisationen,
in REPUBIJK UND WELTBURGERREcir 181, 201 (Klaus Dicke et al.eds., 1998); Mortimer Sellers,
RepublicanPrinciplesin InternationalLaw, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L 403, 425-32 (1996); Fernando R.Tes6n,
The Kantian Theory ofInternationalLaw, 92 COLUM. L REV. 53, 70-102 (1992).
200. Charney, supra note 195, at 769; see also Wolfgang Friedmann, The ChangingDimensions of
InternationalLaw, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1146, 1155 (1962) (attributing the evolution of international law

to the responsiveness of such law to changing international conditions).
201. These arguments also apply and have been brought forward in connection with the growing
importance of multinational corporations in the international system See, e.g., 1/2 DAHM Er AL., supra note
34, § 108; Detlev F. Vagta, The Multinational.Enterprise:A New Challengefor TransnationalLaw, 83
HARV. L REV. 739 (1970); Seymour J. Rubin, MultinationalEnterprise and National Sovereignty: A
Skeptic's Analysis, 3 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1 (1971). However, a detailed analysis of the issue is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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overview of the discussion concerning a definition of what constitutes an
international NGO-a task that is necessary to determine the scope of possible
rights and duties of these entities under international law.2"u
A. The Controversy Over a GenerallyAcceptedDefinition: What Constitutes
an InternationalNGO?
Because of the wide range of actual and possible NGO activities in
international relations, there is no generally accepted definion for these
entities. 3 However, from the working definitions in international agreements,
most prominently in the authoritative interpretation of Article 71 of the
Charter of the United Nations (UNC) provided through resolutions of the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 2" and the numerous definitions
offered in the scholarly literature, some common features exist in the
discussion of the elements necessary for constituting an international NGO.
It is generally recognized that NGOs are characterized negatively by the
fact that they are not established by States through a governmental agreement
under international law." 5 Rather, they are formed on the initiative of private,
natural, or juridical persons based on a contract governed by domestic civil
This element distinguishes NGOs from universal or regional
law.210
international organizations like the United Nations or the Council of Europe,
which States create through international treaties. 0 7 However, at least in the
practice of the United Nations, private entities that include members
designated by governmental authorities are regarded as NGOs, as long as this
governmental participation does not result in dominating political or financial

202. On the necessity of a definition of NGOs in order to interpret the scope of their possible rights
under international law, see Danish, supra note 69, at 165.
203. See Hffiner, supranote 33, at 927, 933; Waldemar Hummer, Internationaleund transnationale
Akteure an oderunter derSchwelle der V6lkerrechtsubjektivitdt,in1 OSTEtRRICHISCHES HANDBUCH DES
VOLKERRECHTs 218, 225 (Hanspeter Neuhold et al. eds., 3rd ed. 1997).
204. See E.S.C. Res. 31, U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 54, U.N. Doc. E/1996/96 (1996).
205.See id. 1 12; see also Rechenberg, supra note 11, at 276; M. Bettati, La Contribution des
OrganisationsNon Gouvernementalesd la Formationet d laApplication du DroitInternational.,in LES
O.N.G.ET LE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 1, 7 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 1986). However, this now wellestablished fact could change if NGOs would be subject to an international agreement that could result in
making NGO formation subject to state scrutiny under international law.
206. NGuYEN Quoc DINH ET AL., DRorr INERNATIONAL PUBLIC 684 (5th ed. 1994); Finn Seyersted,
ApplicableLaw in Relations Between IntergovernmentalOrganizationsandPrvateParties,122 RECUEIL
DES COURS 426, 433-34 (1967).
207. On international organizations, see generally D. W. BOWET, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS (4th ed. 1982); .A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 543 (1 1th ed. 1994).
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influence by a government.2 "s
From these facts, general independence from governmental influence
serves as a further characteristic element of a NGO.2° This is also
demonstrated by the requirement, stated in ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, that
any financial contribution or other direct or indirect support from a
government has to be openly declared and fully recorded in the financial
records of the NGO in question.
Furthermore, for a NGO to be considered "international," the organization
must demonstrate a transnational scope of activities,"'0 should cover "where
possible, a substantial number of countries in different regions of the world"'
In the practice of the NGO
and "shall be international in its structure."'
Committee of ECOSOC, this is the case if an organization has operations in
at least three countries." 3 Other intergovernmental organizations, like the
Council of Europe, require only activities with effect in at least two States.21 4
Besides the requirements of private foundation, international scope, and
general independence from State influence, there are further characteristics of
NGOs that are widely accepted. Among them are the requirements of minimal
organizational structure, an established headquarters," 5 and a
nongovernmental purpose." However, in contrast to their private origins, the
objectives of NGOs are mostly public in nature, involving, for example, the
protection of human rights and concerns for the environment.217
There is some controversy as to whether NGOs must be nonprofit-

208.E.S.C. Res. 31, supra note 204, 12; see also Lagoni, supra note 43, at 906.
209. Hobe, supra note 5, at 194.
210.E.S.C. Res. 31, supra note 204, 8; see also 1/2 DAHM ETAL., supra note 34, § 107; Hobe,
supra note 5, at 194.
211. E.S.C. Res. 1296, U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 21, U.N. Doc. E/4548 (1968).
212.Id. 7.
213.See Lagoni, supranote 43, at 906.
214.European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International NonGovernmental Organizations, Apr. 24, 1986, Europ. T.S. 124 [hereinafter European Convention]; see also
Marie-Odile Wiederkehr, La Convention Europeenne sur la Reconnaissance de laPersonnalit Juridique
des OrganisationsInternationalesNon Governementales du 24 Avril 1986, 33 ANNUAIRB FRANCAIS DE
DRorr INTERNATIONAL 749, 753 (1987); Frits W. Hondius, European Convention on the Recognition of
the Legal Personality ofInternational Non-Governmental Organizations, 7 PHRANTROPIST 6 (1988).
215. E.S.C. Res. 31, supra note 204, 10.
216. See generally Hummer, supra note 203, at 225; 1/2 DAHM ET AL., supranote 34, § 107; Hobe,
supra note 5, at 194.
217. MacAlister-Sritth, supra note 16, at 481.
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oriented."' The nonprofit criterion serves to differentiate NGOs from
transnational corporations which, although like NGOs are also established by
private contract, are in general solely profit-oriented economic entities."' This
is true insofar as organizations that have profit-orientation as their primary
purpose cannot be regarded as NGOs, since they pursue economic objectives,
in contrast to NGOs which are generally functioning to promote the public
interest in the international realm.
However, it would be inappropriate to apply this criterion in a literal sense
because most of the larger and influential NGOs have at least some full-time
and professional staff members."' NGOs are therefore allowed to have
income to finance their primary activities in order to pursue their purposes. 2 '
The necessity for financial income becomes obvious in light of the goal of
securing the independence of these organizations from governmental
influence.2 Thus the criterion of nonprofit orientation is to be understood as
excluding only organizations that primarily pursue profits, like transnational
corporations.
Furthermore, it is generally required in the scholarly literature that an
NGO be oriented toward the rule of law, which excludes from the definitional
scope of NGOs organizations that pursue illegal goals, like transnational

218.See Rechenberg, supra note 11, at 276; Wiederkehr, supra note 214, at 754; Hummer, supra note
203, at 225; see also Martha L Schweitz, Indigenous Environmental NGOs and International Law: A
Reconstruction ofRoles and Possibilities, 27 U.B.C. L. REv. 133, 137 (1993) (advocating the exclusion
of commercial profit-seeking enterprises from the scope of NGOs).
219. On transnational corporations, see generally Dietmar Bachmann, Transnational Corporations,
in 2 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE 1239 (Raldiger Woifrum & Christiane Philipp eds.,
1995); CYNTMA D. WALLACE, LEGAL CONTROL OF TE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1982); D. KokkiniIatridou & P.J.I.M. de Waart, Foreign Investments in Developing Countries-Legal Personality of
Multinationals in International Law, 14 NETL Y.B. INT'L L 87 (1983).
220. MacAlister-Smith, supra note 16, at 481. On the importance of professional staff personnel for
the effectiveness of NGO activities, see also Kathryn A. Sikkink, Nongovernmental Organizations,
Democracy, and Human Rights in Latin America, in BEYOND SOVEREgGNTY-COLLECTVELY DEFENDING
DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS 150, 151 (Tom Farer ed., 1996).

221. See also Timothy C. Evered, Foreign Investment Issues for International Non-Governmental
Organizations: International Health Projects in China and the Former Soviet Union, 3 BUFF. J. INT'l L
153, 156 (1996); Peter R. Baehr, Mobilization of the Conscience ofMankind: Conditions ofEffectivness
of Human Rights NrOs, in REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE LOW COUNTRIES--IN

HONOUR OF PAUL DE WAART 135, 137 (Erik Denters & Nico Schrijver eds., 1998).
222.1/2 DAHM ET AL, supra note 34, § 107.
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terrorist or organized criminal groups.2 2 However, this does not mean that
organizations, which are sometimes willing to breach the law in order to
pursue their goals, cannot be regarded as NGOs.2 " Thus, the strategy of
Greenpeace, which sometimes breaks laws intentionally, does not exclude this
organization from being a NGO. Rather, it is sufficient in fulfilling this
requirement if an organization is, in pursuing its legitimate objective,
generally oriented toward the rule of law.
In addition, some dispute exists whether internationally-oriented private
organizations which are pursuing either primarily religious purposes, like the
International Council of Christian Churches or the Muslim World League, or
primarily political purposes, like transuational factions and parties, m can be
regarded as NGOs. 226 However, since there are no systematic reasons for
excluding these entities from the scope of NGOs because of their religious or
political purposes, and taking into account that religious organizations often
also undertake global humanitarian activities, these organizations should also
be regarded as NGOs.Iv This inclusion is also supported by the working
definition of NGOs adopted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), which includes "churches and other religious
groups and missions.... ,22
A general exception is only made for certain religious sects which do not
allow their members a voluntary withdrawal from the organization. This
exception, however, need not be based on the religious orientation of these
groups. Taking into account that the legal systems of a great number of
countries recognize an individual right of association in the negative form of

223. Hummer, supra note 203, at 226; Hobe, supranote 5, at 194; 1/2 DAHM BT AL., supra note 34,
107. However, the exclusion of these groups does not imply that they are irrelevant in the contemporary
international system. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Erosion of State Authority and its Implicationsfor
EquitableDevelopment, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FAcE 31, 38 (Friedl Weiss
et al. eds., 1998); Sara Jankiewicz, Glasnostand the Growth of GlobalOrganizedCrime, 18 Hotds. J. INT'L
L.215 (1995).
224. See Hobe, supra note 5,at 194.
225.See, e.g., Theodor Schweisfirth, Zur vclkerrechtlichen Bedeutung internationaler
ZErTSCHRIFTFORAUSLANDISCHES
Vereinbarungenregierenderpolitischer(kommunistischer)Parteien,36
OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 586 (1976).
226. Hummer, supra note 203, at 226 (excluding these organizations from the definitional scope of
NGOs).
227. See Rechenber& supra note 11, at 276-77 (including NGOs working in the religious and political
sector); 1/2 DAIHA ET AL., supra note 34, § 107; LADOR-LEDERER, supranote 17, at 60 (including religious
NGOs).
228. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, VOLUNTARY AID FOR
DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 14 (1988).

§
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being free to leave an organization, 29 a right which is also enshrined in a
variety of international human rights conventions,L' it can be argued that such
entities are not generally oriented toward the rule of law and therefore already
are excluded from the definitional scope of NGOs. '
Finally, ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 requires NGOs that want to enter
into a consultative relationship with the United Nations to have a
democratically-adopted constitution that provides for a representative body of
the members responsible for determining the policy of the organization. 2 In
addition, the NGO must "possess appropriate mechanisms of accountability
to its members, who shall exercise effective control over its policies and
actions through exercise of voting rights or other appropriate democratic and
transparent decisionmaking processes. 2 1 33 It is doubtful whether these
requirements can be regarded as being generally accepted elements in the
definition of NGOs.L Nevertheless, it can be seen as a further indication of
the growing awareness of the importance of democratic legitimation?5 for the
participation and the exercise of NGO influence in the international realm in
accordance with the liberal tradition in international law. 6 Despite the fact
that a controversy about the necessary requirements for constituting a NGO

229. For United States case law that generally defines this right of association, see, for example,
Aboodv. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977). For the Federal Republic of Germany,
see the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, Erftverband, in BVerfGE 10, 89 (99 et seq.);
Arbeitnehmerkammern, BVerfGE 38, 281 (297 et seq.); Mitbestimmungsurteil, BVerfGE 50, 290 (354).
See generally GERALD GUNTER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTrrLrrONAL LAW 1397 (13th ed. 1997).
230. The right to freedom of association in its negative component is expressly recognized in Art. 10
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 ILM. 58, 61 (entered into force
on 21 October 1986). See also the decision of the European Court of Human Rights from 23 June 1981
inLeCompteetal.v. Belgium, in EUROPAIscH GRUNDREcHTE ZIrrscHRjFr 551, 555 (1981)(recognizing
a "negative" freedom of association under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms).
231. 1/2 DAHM ET AL, supra note 34, § 107.
232. E.S.C. Res. 31, supranote 204, 10.
233. Id. 12.
234. Remarkably, the European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of
International Non-Governmental Organizations does not provide for similar requirements. See European
Convention, supra note 214. Also, these elements are rarely discussed in the literature.
235. On the discussion concerning an evolving human right to democracy on the governmental level,
see Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L 46 (1992);
Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L 539 (1992);
Reginald Ezetah, The Right to Democracy: A Qualitative Inquiry, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L 495 (1997).
236. For the importance of democracy in the liberal tradition of international law and international
relations theory, see David P. Fidler, LIBERTAD v. Liberalism: An Analysis ofthe Helms-Burton Actftom
within Liberal International Relations Theory, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 297, 307 (1997); AnneMarie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theory and the Future of the
United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT'L L.& CONTEMP. PROBS. 377, 405 (1994).
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still exists, NGOs can generally be defined as privately founded organizations
that pursue primarily nonprofit-oriented public interest objectives on a
transnational basis in accordance with a general respect for the rule of law.
B. A PossibleSolution Under ContemporaryInternationalLaw-NGOs as
Subjects of InternationalLaw
The question whether NGOs can be regarded as subjects of international
law has to be distinguished from the legal status that NGOs hold under the
national legal order of the State in which they have been constituted or where
they are based. The legal foundation for the establishment of NGOs by
private persons is the right of association, 37 which is enshrined in many
national constitutions' and in a variety of international and regional human
rights agreements. 9 Under national law, NGOs usually hold the status of a
private association in regard to both the conditions of formation and
dissolution and the rules under which they operate.Y
In contrast to the issue of their national status, the question of NGOs as
possible subjects of international law is concerned with their legal personality
under the international legal order and their status in their relations with States
and international organizations. In order to answer this question, one first has
to define the prerequisites that an entity has to fulfill for being a subject of
international law. Secondly, whether NGOs in fact meet these criteria under
contemporary international law has to be evaluated.
1. Subjects of InternationalLaw: A Definition
In contrast to former times, where basically only States had been the
actors on the international scene and constituted the sole subjects of

237. MacAlister-Smith, supra note 16, at 486; Martin A. Ob, Non-Governmental Organizationsin
RegionalHumanRights Systems, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L REv. 307, 312 (1997).
238. See. e.g., G.G. art 9; [German Constitution]; KENPO art 21 [Japanese Constitution].
239. For an overview of various such agreements see, for example, 1/2 DAHM ET AL, supranote 34,
§ 107.
240.Id. For a description of the various national legal status of NGOs, see Michael H. Posner and
Candy Whittome, The Status ofHuman Rights NGOs, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L RBV. 269, 276 (1994);
BEIGBEDER, supra note 11, at 327.
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international law,"" one of the characteristics of contemporary international
law is the wide range of participants in international relations."
Under
current international law, general agreement exists that at least States,
international organizations, and, to a certain extent, individuals are subjects
of rights and duties under international law. 43 However, since there are no
systematic reasons why other non-State entities may not participate in the
international legal system as legally recognized actors, 2" and thus no numerus
clausus of subjects of international law exist, new actors may arise and
achieve international legal status in accordance with the needs of the
45
international society.
However, not all these various entities participating in contemporary
international relations can be regarded as subjects of international law, even
if they may have some degree of influence on the international society. De
facto participation in the international system is not equivalent to acting on the
international scene in legally relevant ways, and thus not deserving of the
qualification as a subject of international law.2" Rather, international legal
personality requires factual participation and some form of community
acceptance through the granting of rights and duties under international law
to the entity in question.2 41
A subject of international law can thus be defined as a natural'or legal
person that on the one side is actively participating on the international plane
and on the other side is capable, and actually in possession, of rights or duties

241. Also, in earlier times some other entities were considered to be subjects of international law, like
belligerents and the free cities of Cracow and Danzig. See Mosler, supra note 130, at 49; ALFRED
VERDRoss & BRUNO SIMMA, UNIvERsELs VOLKERREcHT 222 (3rd ed. 1984).
242. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 74, 103 (1986); PIERREMARIE DUPUY, DROrr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc 20 (3rd ed. 1995); and SHAW, supra note 20, at 138.
243. See BROWNLIE, supra note 93, at 58; 1 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 89
(3rd ed. 1957).
244. Hermann Mosler, Die Erweiterungdes Kreises der Valkerrechtssubjekte, 22 ZErsHRIFr FOR
AusLANDiscHs
HFFENTLICHEs REcHT UND VOLKERRECHT 1, 41 (1962); 1/1 DAHM ET AL., supra note
127, at 23; JESSUP, supranote 164, at 21-22; Chamey, supra note 195, at 762.
245. See Reparationsfor Injuries Suffered in the Service of the UnitedNations, 1949 LC.J. 174, 178
(Apr. 11). See also DETrER, supra note 174, at 32.
246.111 DAHM ET AL., supra note 127, at 21; SHAW, supranote 20, at 138.
247.See JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 12, at 16; 1/1 DAHM ET AL., supra note 127, at 22; P.K.
Menon, The International Personality of Individuals in International Law: A Broadening of the
TraditionalDoctrine, 1 J. TRANSNAT'L L & POL'Y 151, 157-58 (1992).
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under international law.2" Since NGOs are increasingly participating in the
international decisionmaking process and the monitoring of State compliance
with international law, as shown above, the question arises whether they also
fulfill the prerequisite of "community acceptance" by possessing rights or
duties under contemporary international law.
2. The Legal Status ofNGOs Under InternationalLaw
With the exception of some traditional non-State actors in international
relations, like the Holy See, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and
the Sovereign Order of Malta, which more or less undisputedly hold the status
of subjects of international law,249 the still prevailing view among international
legal scholars is that NGOs cannot generally be regarded as subjects of
international law. 5 The arguments in favor of this proposition are mainly
based on the fact that NGOs are created by private, natural, or legal persons
under national law and not, as in the case of international organizations,
through a legal act by States under international law."'
However, the fact that NGOs are not created through a specific legal act
under international law cannot be regarded as an ultimate obstacle to the
possible legal personality of NGOs under international law . 2 Taking into
account the extensive participation of NGOs in the current international
system on the one side, and the purposes pursued by the international legal
order as an "open system" on the other, it becomes increasingly necessary and
justified to raise the question whether NGOs are, or should be, subjects of
international law. The issue of an international legal personality for NGOs
requires a closer look at the current international regulations concerning these
non-State entities in order to determine whether NGOs can already be

248.,See JENNINOS & WATrs, supranote 12, at 120; BROWNU1E, supra note 93, at 58.
249.See de Fischer, supra note 12, at 1; VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 241, at 252. However, the
international legal personality of the International Committee of the Red Cross is disputed by some
international legal scholars. See, e.g., CHRIS N. OKEKE, CONTROVERSIAL SuBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 206 (1974).

250. See, e.g., IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, V6LKEiRtCHT 161, 174 (9th ed. 1997); VERDROSS &
SIM0A, supra note 241, at 251, 268; see also Vedder, supra note 111, at 248, 255; Rechenberg, supra note

11, at 28 1.
251. See, e.g., Lagoni, supra note 43, at 913; Volker Epping, Vv6lkerrechtssubjekte, in VOLKERRECHT
73 (Knut Ipsen ed., 3rd ed. 1990).
252.See Mosler, supranote 244, at 41.
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regarded as partial subjects of international law. 53 Despite a number of draft
conventions proposed by the Institut de DroitInternationalat the beginning
of this century, 4 no international agreement regulating a uniform
international legal status for NGOs exists.2"
Numerous international
regulations addressing the legal position of NGOs in specific areas of
international law do, however, exist. In the following sections, these
regulations will be evaluated to determine whether NGOs fulfill, in a
quantitative as well as a qualitative sense, the criteria of community
acceptance that is necessary for becoming a subject of international law.
a) The Legal Status of NGOs UnderSecondary InternationalLaw
First, the legal status of NGOs under contemporary secondary
international law will be examined. The term "secondary international law"
refers to the body of law that has been implemented by international
organizations and their organs under international treaty regimes.2 5 These
regulations can at least in general also be regarded as a part of public
international law. 257 Next I analyze the legal status that NGOs hold under
secondary international law, first in connection with the UNC and its
specialized organizations, and second, in other areas of international law.
(1) The Legal Role of NGOs Under the UN Charter
The starting point for an investigation of the legal status of NGOs under
secondary international law is Article 71 of the UNC, which states that the
"Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for
consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with

253.This is also expressed in an emerging view among international legal scholars. See 1/2 DAHM ET
AL., supranote 34, § 107; Hobe, supra note 5, at 207; Olz, supranote 237, at 322-23.
254. Macalister-Smith, supra note 16, at 487 n.16.
255. Also, the European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International NonGovernmental Organisations is only concerned with the reciprocal recognition of the legal personalities of
NGOs within the State parties and not with an international legal personalities of these entities. See
European Convention Convention, supra note 214; Wiederkehr, supra note 214, at 750; 1/2 DAHM ET AL.,
supra note 34, § 107.
256.See Mosler, supra note 244, at 45; 1/2 DAHM ET AL., supra note 34, § 107; Hobe, supra note 5,
at 203-04.
257.1/1 DAHM ET AL., supra note 127, at 30. See also Rudolf Bernhardt, Qualifikation und
Anwendungsbereich des internenRechts internationalerOrganisationen,in12 BERIMCIIT DER DEU1TSCHEN
GEsELLscHAFr FOR VOLKERRECHT 7, 24, 42 (Bernhardt & Miehsler eds., 1973).
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matters within its competence." ' 8 From the wording of this provision, which
gives ECOSOC the option, but does not require it, to make arrangements for
a consultative status of NGOs, it seems rather clear that it is not intended to

grant any rights to NGOs."
However, a different conclusion might be taken by looking at the practice
of the UN in implementing Article 71 of the UNC through ECOSOC
Resolution 1996/31." This resolution recently updated ECOSOC Resolution
1296 of 196861 and was drafted by a suborgan of ECOSOC262 in close
cooperation with the NGOs concerned.263
According to ECOSOC Resolution 1996/3 1, NGOs are divided into three
different categories depending on the extent of their involvement with the
activities of ECOSOC. These categories are connected with different
participatory rights, so that, for example, only NGOs in the first category have
the right to submit topics for consideration on the provisional agenda and only
NGOs of the first and the second categories are entitled to send observers to

258.U.N. CHARTER art. 71.
259.See Hffier, supra note 33, at 929; 1/2 DAHM ET AL., supra note 34, § 107; Hobe, supra note 5,
at 201.
260. E.S.C. Res. 31, supranote 204.
261.E.S.C. Res. 1296 (XLIV) (1968). Before the adoption of these resolutions the relationship
between the Economic and Social Council and NGOs was governed by ECOSOC Resolution 288 (X) of
Feb. 27, 1950.
262. E.S.C. Res. 80, U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess., at 86, U.N. Doc. V/1993/80 (1993).
263. See, for example, the reports of the open-ended working group on the review of arrangenents for
consultation with non-governmental organizations. Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the
Review ofArrangementsfor Consultations with Non-Governmental Organizations,U.N. ESCOR, 49th
Sess., Agenda Item 12, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/1994/99 (1994); Report ofthe Open-Ended Working Group on
the Review of Arrangements for Consultation with Non-Governmental Organizationson its Second
Session, U.N. ESCOR, Agenda Item 10, at 1, U.N. Doc. E11995/83 (1995); Open-Ended Working Group
on the Review ofArrangementsfor Consultations with Non-GovernmentalOrganizations: Report ofthe
Working Group on its Third Session, U.N. ESCOR, 4th Seas., at 1, U.N. Doc. EIAC.70/1996/2 (1996).
NGOs themselves took advantage of the possibility to cooperate with the working group by submitting a
number of statements. See, e.g., Statement Submitted by the InternationalCouncil of Women, a NonGovernmental Organization in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council, Category1,
U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sea., Agenda Item 3, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/A.70/1994/NGO/9 (1994); Statement
Submitted by the World Federationof United NationsAssociations, a Non-Governmental Organization
in ConsultativeStatus with the Economic and Social Council,Category1, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Agenda
Item 3, at 1, U.N. Doc. EIAC.70/1994/NGO/1 (1994); Statement Submitted by the InternationalFederation
of Associations of the Elderly, a Non-Governmental Organization in Consultative Status with the
Economic and Social Council, Category I, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 1, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.70/1994/NGO/5 (1994).
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sessions of ECOSOC and its suborgans2 ' These regulations not only grant
rights to NGOs but also provide for some duties that are connected with the
consultative status 65 and ask for some organizational requirements like a
democratically-adopted statute.2" These participatory rights, granted to NGOs
under the internal law of the UN, can be viewed as some form of entitlement
recognized by State practice within the UN267 that is an indication of an at least
indirect legal personality for NGOs under international law.2"
Furthermore, many special organs of the UN maintain similar consultative
arrangements with NGOs, which are regulated in resolutions of the General
Assembly, ECOSOC, or in rules of procedure of the special organs
themselves. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for
example, has adopted the ECOSOC division of three categories, while
organizations such as the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN
Environment Programme (UNEP), and the UN Development Programme
(UNDP) only list NGOs without categorization. 69 In addition, other
specialized organizations of the UN familiy have a formalized consultative
relationship with NGOs according to their constitutions, like Article 12 (4) of
the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Constitutiono and Article 27 of the International Telecommunication Union

264. For a more detailed description, see Marcel Merle, Article .71, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES
1047, 1051 (Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet eds., 2nd ed. 1991); Lagoni, supra note 43, at 905; Hlfner,
supra note 33, at 929; JULIA ZIEGLER, DIE BETEILIoUNo VON NICHTRBoEIERUNoSOROANiSATIONEN
(NGOS) AM MENscHENREcHTsscHurzsYSmEM DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN (1998). See generally Dianne
Otto,Nongovernmental Organizations in the UnitedNations System: The Emerging Role oflnternational
Civil Society, 18 HuM. RTS. Q. 107, 113 (1996) (discussing the relationship between non-governmental
organizations and the U.N.).
265.See I/2 DAHM ET AL., supranote 34, § 107.
266. Beit Bartram & Dorte Pardo L6pez, Observer Status, in 2 UNTED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIEs
AND PRACTICE 936,945 (Rtldiger Wolfrum & Christiane Philipp eds., 1995).
267. Hobe, supranote 5, at 203.
268. See 1/2 DAHM ET AL., supra note 34, § 107; Mosler, supra note 244, at 45. See also JENNINGS
& WArrs, supranote 12, at 21(describing the ways in which various non-State entities have traditionally
been subjected to international law); Hummer, supranote 203, at 226.
269. Hther, supra note 33, at 931.
270. See also Resolution 104 EX/3 of the Executive Committee ofUNESCO, under which NGOs have
the possibility to submit petitions on behalf of victims of human rights violations. Jost Delbrflck, NonJudicialProcedures ofEnforcement of Internationally Protected Human Rights with Special Emphasis
on the Human Rights Practice of UNESCO, in NEUNMTS DEUTScH-POLISCHM

31, 42 (Jost Delbrfck et al. eds., 1992); 1/2 DAiM ST AL., supra note 34, § 107.
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(ITU) Convention.2 '
(2) Other Areas ofInternationalLaw
Outside the UN, the two most important fields where rights are granted to
NGOs under secondary international law are human rights law and
international environmental law. Under international law related to the
protection of human rights, one can name on the universal level the status
granted to NGOs by special organs of the United Nations like the Commission
on Human Rights.2n Furthermore, on the regional level, NGOs are entitled to
observer and consultative status under the organs of the Council of Europe,
with which they cooperate in a vast variety of activities.2" In contrast, the
Organization of American States (OAS) has not institutionalized its
relationship with NGOs, but has entered into agreements of cooperation on a
case by case basisY 4 The same is true for the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), which has granted observer status to a few Africa-oriented NGOs 5
In the field of environmental protection, NGOs are entitled under a
growing number of treaty regimes to observer status at the Conference of the
parties to the treaty and in some cases even to more active participation by
2 6
For example, observer status and active assistance
assisting the SecretariatY.
are provided for under Articles 11 and 12 of the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species,2" Article 7 of the United Nations Framework

271. For a more detailed overview, see Michael M. Gunter, Toward a Consultative Relationship
Between the UnitedNations andNon-GovernmentalOrganizations?,10 VAND. J. TRANNAT'L L 557,569
(1977); Hlfner, supranote 33, at 931-32.
272. See U.N. ESCOR Rules of Procedure of the Functional Commissions of the Economic and Social
Council, at 18, U.N. Doc. E/5975/Rev. 1 (1983); see also 1/2 DAHM ET AL., supra note 34, § 107.
273.See Andrew Drzemczewski, The Role of NGOs in Human Rights Matters in the Council of
Europe, 8 HUM. RTS. LJ. 273 (1987); 61z, supranote 237, at 332-34.
274. Olz, supranote 237, at 354.
275.Id. at 360-61.
276. For a more detailed evaluation of the role of NGOs in treaty regimes in the field of international
environmental law see Raustiala, supra note 68, at 543-52; Ardia, supra note 100, at 552-54.
277. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973,
993 U.N.T.S. 243. For the participation of NGOs, see Phillipe J. Sands & Alfred P. Bedecarre, Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species: The Role of Public Interest Non-Governmental
Organizationsin Ensuring the Effective Enforcement ofthe Ivory Trade Ban, 17 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV.
799, 801 (1990); Laura H. Kosloff & Mark C. Trexler, The Convention on International Trade in
EndangeredSpecies: EnforcementTheory andPracticein the UnitedStates, 5 B.U. INT'L LJ.327,335-36
(1987).
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Convention on Climate Change," and Article 4 of the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.279
Finally, one of the most recent examples for NGO participation in
international law is the World Trade Organization, which-in contrast to
GATT, but in accordance with the original intent of the founders of the
international trading system under the International Trade Organization2 provides in Article V.2 of its Charter that "[t]he General Council may make
appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with nongovernmental organizations. 2 8 '
(3) Conclusion on Secondary InternationalLaw
These various rights, granted to NGOs by international organizations and
their organs, and existing under treaty regimes, can be regarded as indications
of legal status under international law.ss Secondary international law thus
provides the "community acceptance" required for an entity to become a
subject of international law. The institutionalization of NGO rights to
participate in conference deliberations and international legal regimes
provides for the effective presentation of their views and thus has to be
regarded as a significant step in the development toward an international legal
status of NGOs.2 s3

278.United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on
Climate Change, May 9, 1992,31 I.LM. 849,862; see also Chiara Giorgetti, The Role ofNongovernmental
Organizationsin the Climate Change Negotiations,9 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 115 (1998).
279. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161 U.N.T.S. 72. See also
Kieran Mulvaney, The International Whaling Commission and the Role of Non-Governmental
Organizations, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. REV. 347 (1997); Judith Berger-Eforo, Sanctuaryfor the Whales:
Will This be the Demise of the InternationalWhaling Commission or a Viable Strategy for the TwentyFirstCentury?, 8 PACE INT'L L. REV. 439, 478 (1996).
280. See Steve Charnovitz & John Wickham, Non-Governmental Organizationsand the Original
InternationalTrade Regime, 29 J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1995, at 111; Chamovitz, supra note 83, at 337.
281.Agreement Establishingthe World Trade Organization,33 LLM. 1144, 1146 (1994). On the
issue of a possible participation of NGOs in the WTO, see William M. Reichert, Resolving the Trade and
EnvironmentConflict: The WTO andNGO ConsultativeRelations, 5 MfNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 219 (1996);
Charnovitz, supra note 83, at 331. For a critical view on this issue, see Philip M. Nichols, Extension of
Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to NongovernmentalParties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L 295,318 (1996).
282. See Hobe, supra note 5, at 203; Danish, supranote 69, at 162-63.
283.See also Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the Erosion of
National Sovereignty andDemocracy,95 MIcH. L REV. 1944, 1964 (1997).
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b) The Legal Positions of NGOs Under PrimaryInternationalLaw
One can also find legal entitlements of NGOs under primary international
law, which means that the rights of NGOs derive directly from international
treaties concluded by, and binding upon, States. The legal status of NGOs is
especially noteworthy in the areas of the protection of human rights,
international humanitarian law, and in the regulatory system of the
International Labor Organization.
(1) The Legal Status ofNGOs in the InternationalLabor Organization
Article 24 of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization
(ILO) states that labor unions and business associations can file complaints to
the ILO concerning treaty violations by ILO Member States.'
Even the
structure of the ILO itself, with representatives of governments, labor unions,
and business associations as formal participants in an equal division," reflects
a strong and unique institutionalized position for NGOs in an international
organization and in the operation of an international legal regime.
(2) Entitlements of NGOs in the Protectionof Human Rights
In the field of the international protection of human rights on the regional
level in Europe, the Americas, and Africa, intergovernmental organizations
grant rights to NGOs under primary international law. Under Article 25 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, NGOs are entitled to submit applications to the European
Commission of Human Rights, claiming to be a victim of a violation of one
of the rights set forth in the Convention. 2" The position of NGOs as

284. See 1/2 DAHM ET AL., supranote 34, § 107; David Weissbrodt & James McCarthy, Fact-Finding
by InternationalNongovernmental Human Rights Organizations,22 VA. J. INT'L L 1, 23-31 (1981).
285. See Peter A. Kthler, ILO-InternationalLabour Organization, in I UNITED NATIONS: LAW,
POLITIES AND PRACTICE 714, 717 (Rfldiger Wolfrum & Christane Philipp eds., 1995); Raustiala, supra note
68, at 553.
286. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art.
25, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 236 (entered into force on Sept. 3, 1953).
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applicants has been further strengthened by Protocol No. 9,21 under which
they have, in certain circumstances, the right to refer cases to the European
Court of Human Rights without the assistance and approval of the European
Commission on Human Rights. Furthermore, the entry into force of Protocol
No. 112' on 1 November 1998, which creates a single European Court of
Human Rights through a merger of the Commission and the current court,
again improves the legal standing of NGOs. The new Article 34 of the
Convention as amended by Protocol No. 11 is based on the former Article 25
and provides the opportunity for NGOs to bring cases directly before the new
European Court of Human Rights.'
Furthermore, the additional protocols to the European Social Charter290 are
worth mentioning, even though these protocols are not now in force. Under
Protocol No. 2 of 1991, NGOs can cooperate with the organs established
under this Charter, and the Governmental Committee and the Secretary
General shall also consult and provide information for NGOs related to the
matters governed by the Charter. Furthermore, the Additional Protocol to the
European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints of
1995,291" which by its preamble is intended to strengthen NGO participation,
gives NGOs the right to submit complaints alleging unsatisfactory application
of the Charter. 2
Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, NGOs are, according to
Article 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights, entitled to "lodge
petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or complaints of

287.Protocol No.9 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
30 I.LM. 693 (1991) (entered into force on Oct. 1, 1994). See also Frank Bodendiek & Karsten Nowrot,
Die RechtsprechungdesEuropdischenGerichtshofsftrMenschenrechte im Jahre1995,39 GERMAN Y.B.
INT'L L. 481-82 (1996).
288. See Council of Europe: Explanatory Report and Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 33 LLM. 943 (1994). See also Henry G.
Schermers, The European Court ofHumanRightsAfterthe Merger, 18 EUR. L REV. 493 (1993); Stephan
Hobe, Stdrkung des Menschenrechtsschutzes in Europa: Das 11. Zusalzprotokoll zur Europdischen
Menschenrechtskonvention, 30 JuRIsTIscE ARBEITSBLATrER 909 (1998).
289. See 6l7, supranote 237, at 349.
290.European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (entered into force on Feb. 26, 1965).
291. Council of Europe: Protocol Amending the European Social Charter Providing for a System of
Collective Complaints, Nov. 9, 1995,34 LLM. 1453, 1456 (1995).
292. See 4lz,
supranote 237, at 349.
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violation of this Convention by a State Party." 93 NGOs are also granted rights
under primary international law by the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights.294 Article 45 of the Charter states the African Commission's
obligation to cooperate with NGOs, which is also institutionalized in Chapter
XIII of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. Furthermore, Article 55 of
the African Charter in connection with Rule 114 of the Rules of Procedure
allows NGOs to file complaints concerning human rights violations to the
Commission. A similar right for non-State complaints is also established
under Article 42 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child

of 1990, which is, however, not in force. 9
(3) The Rights of NGOs in InternationalHumanitarianLaw
Another area of international law in which NGOs are granted rights under
treaty regimes is the field of international humanitarian law. The International
Committee of the Red Cross has a variety of functions under the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 as well as the two Additional Protocols of 1977.2%
Among other specific entitlements, in cases of armed conflicts, the ICRC has
the right to create a Central Prisoner of War Information Agency, 297 as well as
to create a similar agency for protected civilians. 291 Furthermore, the
organization has the right to establish hospital zones and localities, as well as
neutralized zones in areas suffering armed conflict.2" The Conventions even

293. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 LLM. 673, 687 (1970).
294. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 LLM. 59 (1982) (entered into
force on Oct. 21, 1986). For the participation of NGOs see also 6 1z, supranote 237, at 360.
295.See Bankole Thompson, Africa's Charter on Children'sRights: A Normative Break with
Cultural Traditionalism,41 INT'L & CoMP. L Q. 432 (1992); 01z, supranote 237, at 360 n.210.
296. For an overview of the rights of the ICRC under these conventions see Schl~gel, supra note 21,
at 815; SHAW, supranote 20, at 820.
297.See Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisonen of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
123, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 355 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 2d ed. 1981).
298. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 140, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 297, at 427.
299. Geneva Convention (1) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces inthe Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 23, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 297, at 305;
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts.
14, 15, in TH LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 297, at 427; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict,
June 8, 1977, art.
60, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supranote 297, at 551.
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allow States to entrust the ICRC with the functions of a Protecting Power,"
so that this organization can be appointed by a party to an international
conflict to look after the interests of this party's nationals which are under
adverse control."0

In addition, the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and Their
Destruction provides a role for NGOs in the assistance of the destruction of
anti-personnel mines. This is not only restricted to the ICRC, but is also
extended to NGOs in general.'
(4) Conclusion on PrimaryInternationalLaw
This illustrative list of rights granted to NGOs under primary international
law shows that these entities not only possess a certain legal status under the
secondary international law of international organizations and treaty regimes,
but also hold a growing number of legal entitlements under primary
international law.3"3 This can be regarded as a further indication that NGOs
not only participate in the interactions of the international system, but also
have gained acceptance by the international community and thus received a
legal personality under international law.
c) The Role of NGOs as Amici Curiae and Public InterestLiigatorsin
InternationalJudicialBodies
In determining whether NGOs can be regarded as subjects of international
law, one can also look at their role as amici curiae and litigators in the public
interest in international judicial bodies. NGOs are especially active as amici

300. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 8-10, inTHE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLCTS, supra note 297, at 305;
Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, arts.
8-10, in THE LAWS OF ARNM CONFLICTS, supra note 297, at 333;
Geneva Convention (R) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 8-10, in THE
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supranote 297, at 355; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts.
9, 11, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra

note 297, at 427; Protocol L art. 5,in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supranote 297, at 551.
301.On the functions of Protecting
HUMANITARIAN LAW 40-41 (1990).

Powers, see Hn.AiRE
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302. Article 6 of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer ofAnti-PersonnelMines and TheirDestruction, supra note 2, at art. 6.
303. See 1/2 DAHM Br AL., supra note 34, at § 107; Hobe, supra note 5, at 205.
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curiae in the regional human rights systems of the Americas and Europe, in
contrast to the fact that they have only once participated in proceedings before
the International Court of Justice." 4 The European Court of Human Rights,
after first showing reluctance to allow NGOs to submit amicus briefs in
pending cases," 5 permitted third party intervention first in the Winterwerp
case' and in Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom' and then
amended Article 37 (2) of its Rules of Procedure in 1982 to create an explicit
legal basis for these submissions.0 After that amendment, the Court received
A further
37 amicus curiae briefs in 26 cases from 1983 to 1995.'
consolidation of the role of NGOs as amici curiae under the European
Convention of Human Rights can be expected with the entry into force of
Protocol No. 11, which will lead to the incorporation of a provision on third
party intervention, by allowing NGOs to appear as amici curiae, into the
Convention itself through a new Article 36 (2).
An even more extensive amicus curiae practice exists before the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.31 This Court allows for third party
intervention by NGOs under Article 34 of its Rules of Procedure and has
received over 100 amicus curiae briefs.3 ' Furthermore, NGOs have not only
submitted written briefs but have also participated in oral hearings.'
NGO participation as amici curiae in international judicial bodies
contributes to the development of international law through litigation. NGOs
acting in this way can influence the interpretation and sometimes the creation
of international law through international courts and tribunals. In order to
show the amount of influence of amici curiae on the development of a legal
system, one need only to refer to developments on the domestic level in the

304. Only in the advisory opinion on the international legal status of South-West Africa did the I.C.J.
permit the International League for the Rights of Man to submit a brief. See Charnovitz, supra note 16, at
279. For the role of NGOs as amici curiae before the I.C.J. and its predecessor, the P.C.I.J., see generally
Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial
Proceedings,88 AL. J.INr'L L 611, 619 (1994).
305. See Shelton, supra note 304, at 630.
306. Winterwerp v. Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1979).
307. Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom, 44 Eur. CL H. R- (ser. A) (1980).
308. See 517, supra note 237, at 348.
309.1d.
310. See Dinah Shelton, The Jurisprudenceof the Inter-AmericanCourt of Human Rights, 10 A.
U. J. INT'L L & PoL'Y 333, 348-51 (1994); 61z, supranote 237, at 359.
311.David Padilla, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of
American States: A CaseStudy, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 95, 111 (1993).
312. Shelton, supra note 304, at 640; Olz, supra note 237, at 360; Padilla, supranote 311, at 111.
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United States.? Amici curiae participation by public interest groups has had
a significant impact on the development of constitutional law, as in the "civil
316
315
rights era,"" 4 and the development of environmental law in this country.
Furthermore, NGOs are also engaged in public interest litigation before
international and supranational courts. For example in Greenpeace v.
Commission, the applicants before the European Court of Justice challenged
a decision of the Commission of the European Communities to give Spain
financial assistance for two power stations, but were denied locus standi
before the Court. 7 Although the possibilities for public interest group
litigation before these courts is as yet only very limited, in the case of the
European Court of Justice there have been some discussions whether to grant
31
public interest groups like NGOs locus standi for this kind of litigation.
This would further strengthen the influence of these entities as a "private
attorney general" 319 in the interpretation and development of international law,
especially in the area of environmental law.

In this connection, one can again point to the parallel developments in the
United States. During the first four decades of this century, the Supreme
Court required a party to be directly harmed in order to have locus standi
before the Court when suing a government official.32 A turning point came
in the era of the New Deal, in FederalCommunication Commission (FCC) v.
SanderBrothers Radio Station,321where the Supreme Court found the plaintiff

had standing to vindicate the public interest in adequate radio service.

313. For such a comparison, see Tarlock, supranote 6, at 64.
314.See, e.g., JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS INTHE COURTS: HOWADEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS
FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994).
315. Susan Hedman, Friendsofthe Earth andFriendsof the Court: Assessing the Impact of Interest
Group Amici Curiae in Environmental Cases decided by the Supreme Court, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 187
(1991).
316.See Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court
Litigation: An AppraisalofHakman 's "Folklore," 16 1 & SoC'Y REv. 311,313 (1981).
317. See Greenpeace and Others v, Commission, 1995 ECR IL 2209, para. 60.
318. See, e.g., Heike Gading, Litigationby Public-InterestGroupsin EuropeanLaw, 39 GERM. Y.B.
INT'L L 361 (1996).
319. Seethe statement of Judge Jerome Frank inAssociatedIndustries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d
Cir. 1943) for an application of this model to international NGOs; David A. Wirth, Legitimacy,
Accountability, andPartnership:A ModelforAdvocacy on Third World EnvironmentalIssues, 100 YALE
LJ. 2645 (1991); Tarlock, supra note 6, at 67.
320. See, e.g., City of Atlanta v. Ickes, 308 U.S. 517 (1939); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S.
113, 125 (1940).
321.309 U.S. 470 (1940).
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Furthermore in 1972, the Court stated in SierraClub v. Morton" that a public
interest group may have locus standi before the Court to represent the public
interest." The fact that a similar development now may be under way on the
international level can be seen as an indication that the processes of
globalization are not only affecting domestic policy and legislation,324 but also
developments at the global level, which can be seen as a repetition of domestic
phenomena on the global scene.
Another notable case in connection with the role of NGOs in judicial
proceedings is the arbitration between France and Greenpeace following the
destruction of the Rainbow Warriorby French government agents in a New
Zealand port in 1985. It was the first time that an international damages case
was arbitrated by agreement between a State and an international NGO.325
This fact is especially worth mentioning because the discussion over the
international legal personality of MNCs, as the other potential non-State
candidates for becoming subjects of international law, mainly focuses on the
legal character of agreements between States and these entities.326 The fact
that now NGOs are also starting to enter into international agreements with
States is a further indication of their growing legal status under international
law.
3. Conclusion
This brief analysis of entitlements granted to NGOs under primary and
secondary international law in connection with their involvement as amici
curiae in international judicial bodies also shows that NGOs have gained
recognition by the international community as important actors in the current
international legal order. Taking into account the extensive de facto
participation of these entities in international relations and the character and

322.405 U.S. 727 (1972).
323. 309 U.S. at 476-77; see also Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional
Analysis, 86 HARV. L REV. 645, 667-69 (1973); Jerry L. Mashaw, "Rights" in the FederalAdministrative
State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129,1141-46 (1983).
324.See Alfred C. Arnan, Jr., The Earth as Eggshell Victim: A Global Perspective on Domestic
Regulation, 102 YALE LJ. 2107, 2119-22 (1993); AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW INA GLOBAL ERA, supra
note 48, at 131.
325. See Philip Shabecoff, FranceMust Pay Greenpeace $8Million in Sinking of Ship, N.Y. Tlvlns,
Oct. 3, 1987, at L-2; Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 265; PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 98-99 (7th ed. 1997).
326. See, e.g., 1/2 DAHM ET AL., supranote 34, § 108.
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purpose of the international system as an "open society under the rule of law,"
NGOs can thus be regarded as partial subjects of international law,"' with the
consequence that they are also bound by the norms of the international legal
order applicable to them.
C. A Suggestionfor the FutureDevelopment oflnternationalLaw-Creating
a Universal "Code of Conduct"for NGOs
Besides the qualification of NGOs as subjects of the international legal
community, another possible legal construction for making these entities
bound by international law would be the creation of a "Code of Conduct" for
NGOs in the form of an international agreement. Such an attempt to regulate
the behavior of non-State actors in the international system would not be an
entirely new development. Steps in this direction have already been
undertaken by the UN and numerous other international organizations on the
universal and regional levels concerning the formulation of regulations
governing the behavior of transnational corporations,' which, however, have
not resulted in a binding international agreement.329
The advantage of an international treaty regulating the duties and rights
of NGOs would be its precision compared to the often uncertain and inexact
legal positions under customary law. 33 Furthermore it would dispel any given
doubts concerning the legal personality of NGOs under international law,
since these entities could be, at least toward the contracting parties, regarded
as derivative subjects of international law. However, certain disadvantages,
or at least concerns, are c6nnected with the development of a code of conduct

327. The same view concerning the international legal personality of NGOs was taken three decades
ago by Joseph A. Kaiser, Nichtstaatliche Internationale Organisationen, in 2 WORTERBUCH DES
VOLKERRECHTS 612, 614 (Karl Strupp & Hans-Jalrgen Schlochauer eds., 2nd ed. 1961); J.J. Lador-Lederer,
Nichtstaatliche Organisationenund die Frageder Erweiterungdes Kreises der V6lkerrechtssubjekte, 23
ZEm'sCHRiFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES REcHT UND VOLKERRHcHT 657, 677 (1963). More
recently, see DETrER, supra note 174, at 125; Oz, supranote 237, at 323; see also 1/2 DAHM HT AL., supra

note 34, § 107; Jost Delbrilck, Von der Staatenordnungfiber die internationaleinstitutionelleKooperation
zur 'supraterritorialor global governance': Wandel des zwischenstaatlichen V61kerrechts zur
Rechtsordnung des Menschen und der V61ker ?, in WELTINNENPOLrIK 55, 64 (Ulrich Bartosch & Jochen
Wagner eds., 1998); Hobe, supranote 5, at 207.
328.See, e.g., WALLACE, supra note 219; 1/2 DAHM ET AL., supra note 34, § 108; Barbara A. Frey,
The Legal andEthicalResponsibilitiesof TransnationalCorporationsin the ProtectionofHuman Rights,
6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153 (1997).
329. 1/2 DAHM ET AL., supra note 34, § 108; Hans W. Baade, The LegalEffects ofCodes ofConduct
for MultinationalEnterprises,22 GERM. Y.B. INT'L L 11, 17 (1979).
330.See also Lador-Lederer,supra note 327, at 677.
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for NGOs. Bearing in mind the rather hostile attitude of some States toward
many NGOs and the attempts of States to limit or prevent their effective
operation, 33' care would have to be taken in the process of drafting such a
convention that States do not use it as a means to restrict the activities of
NGOs in a way that would be disproportional to the goal to be achieved. For
this reason and also to enhance the legitimacy of the convention, NGOs should
be strongly involved in this project.
However, even if a binding international convention on the rights and
duties of NGOs cannot be expected to be agreed upon in the near future,
resolutions adopted by organs of international organizations regarding the
behavior of NGOs could have a certain affect on the legal position and
conduct of NGOs, although they are not binding upon them. By directly
addressing rules of behavior toward NGOs, those resolutions would express
the expectation of the international community that NGOs are voluntarily
complying with such an adopted code of conduct.332
VI. PossIBImITs FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AGAINST NGOs
Because the international legal order lacks a central enforcement
authority, the question of the enforcement of international law toward its
subjects has always been a crucial one, which even led some scholars like
Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Austin333 to deny international law its character as
law.334 However, since there are certain enforcement mechanisms in the
international legal system, which are only mostly disorganized and

331. See Posner & Whittome, supranote 96, at 272.
332.1/2 DAHM ET AL., supra note 34, § 108, concerning non-binding codes of conduct for
transnational corporations.
333. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 127 (Herbert LA. Hart ed.,
1954); see also JENNINGS & WATTS, supranote 12, at 8.
334. On this issue, see also HERBERT LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213 (Peter Cane et al. eds.,
2d ed. 1994). See generally Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, InternationalLaw and the Concept of Law:
Why InternationalLaw Is Law, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST
CENTURY-EssAys IN HONOUR OF KRYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI 79 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996); and
D'Anato, supra note 165, at 1293.
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decentralized, 3 one can also think about possibilities for the enforcement of
international law toward NGOs.
As in the area of the international protection of human rights, where the
"non-internationalists" and the "transnationalists" have developed as the two
major schools of thought reflecting different enforcement strategies, 36 there
are basically two corresponding strategies for the enforcement of international
law against NGOs. On the one side, there is the "classical" way of
decentralized law enforcement through States. On the other side, one can also
think for the future of a more centralized enforcement of international law
applicable to NGOs through either international organizations or even through
NGO self-regulatory regimes. However, since the issue of enforcement of
international law against NGOs has to be regarded as a question for the future
of the international system, the discussion of this topic naturally has to remain
a theoretical one under contemporary international law.
In the following sections, these different strategies for the possible
enforcement of international law against NGOs will be discussed, including
comparisons with new enforcement strategies toward multinational
corporations and possible advantages and disadvantages of the different
approaches.
A. DecentralizedEnforcement Through Individual States
Under existing international law, non-State actors, especially individuals,
can be held responsible for the international crimes of piracy, genocide,
torture, and war crimes in domestic courts under the concept of universal
jurisdiction.337 In addition, when evaluating the possibility of decentralized
enforcement through individual States against non-State actors such as NGOs,
one can point to some recent developments in the enforcement of international

335. See I/l DAHM ET AL., supranote 127, at 43; JENNINGs & WAriS, supra note 12, at 10.
336. The "non-internationalists" claim that the protection of human rights is essentially a matter of
States. This school of thought generally relies for the enforcement of international law on the sovereign
States. In contrast, the "transnationalists" aim at overcoming the sovereign state as the dominant
constituent element of the international system.
Transnational mechanisms of international law
enforcement are conceived of as being either of a self-regulatory regime type or of a supranational nature.
See Jost DelbrOck, International Protection ofHuman Rights and State Sovereignty, 57 IND. L.J. 567, 568
(1982).
337.See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 256 (7th ed. 1995); Brigitte Stern, La
compdtence universelle en France: le cas des crimes commis en ex-Yugoslavie et au Rwanda, 40 GERM.
Y.B. INT'L L 280 (1997).
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legal standards toward private corporations in the United States.
First, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996,1 commonly referred to as the "Helms-Burton Act," provides for
liability under international law of nationals and corporations of third States
for trafficking in illegally expropriated property in Cuba. The novelty of the
Helms-Burton Act is the domestic judicial remedy established to enforce the
international law on expropriation and human rights.339 Despite the ongoing
discussion about the legality of this legislative measure under contemporary
international law,3" at least the procedure adopted could also provide a useful
tool for the decentralized enforcement of international law against NGOs on
the domestic level. Through the enforcement model provided by the HelmsBurton Act, a violation of international legal norms by a NGO could be
enforced in domestic courts, regardless of where the act was committed.
Another notable example for the domestic enforcement of international
law against non-State actors is the recent attempts of Burmese citizens to sue
American oil companies in U.S. courts for entering into joint ventures with the
Burmese government. " The plaintiffs allege that the operation of these joint
ventures involves human rights violations. This enforcement mechanism
could also be applicable to NGOs which can be accused of violating
international law in the course of their activities. These organizations could

338. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110
Stat. 785 (Mar. 12, 1996). See Fidler, supra note 236, at 297; Lucien J. Dhooge, Fiddlingwith Fidel: An
Analysis of the Cuban Liberty andDemocraticSolidarityAct of 1996, 14 ARIZ.J. INT'L & CON. L. 575
(1997); Joseph V. Walker, The Legality of the Secondary Boycotts Contained in the Helms-Burton Act
Under InternationalLaw, 3 DEPAUL DIG. INT'L L. 1 (1997).
339. See Fidler, supra note 236, at 325.
340. Compare Brice M. Clagett, The Controversy over Title 11 of the Helms-Burton Act: Who Is
Breaking International Law--the United States, or the States That Have Made Themselves CoConspiratorswith Cuba in its Unlawfil Confiscations?,30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 271 (199697); Brice M. Clagett, Title 111 of the Helms-Burton Act Is Consistent with InternationalLaw, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 434 (1996); David Kaye, The Helms-BurtonAct: Title III andInternationalClaims,20 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L.Rev. 729 (1997) (arguing for the conformity of the Helms-Burton Act with international
law), with Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AvL J. INT'L L. 419
(1996); Robert L. Muse, A Public InternationalLaw Critique of the ExtraterritorialJurisdictionof the
Helms-BurtonAct (CubanLiberty and Democratic Solidarity(LIBERTAD) Act of1996),30 GEO.WASH.
J.INT'L L & ECON. 207 (1996-97); Christian Franken, The Helms-Burton Act: Force or Folly of the
World's Leader?, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157 (1998) (advocating the illegality of the Act with
international law).
341. John Doe I v. UNOCAL Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also National Coalition
Government of the Union of Burma v. UNOCAL, Inc., No.CV96-6112 RAP BQRX 1997 WL 731512
(C.D. Cal.). See also Lori Fisler Damrosch, EnforcingInternationalLaw Through Non-ForcibleMeasures,
269 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 91-99, 166-167 (1997).
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be held responsible for violations of international law in the domestic courts
of all countries.
These two examples show the evolution of international law enforcement
against non-State actors by non-State actors in domestic courts. It is
considerably more difficult to image potential scenarios in which NGOs are
accused of violating norms of international law, since NGOs are much less
likely to violate international legal rules than multinational corporations.
However, the growing involvement of NGOs in international legal regimes
and, for example, development projects also increases the danger of potential
abuses oftheir influence and power through these organizations. Furthermore,
the growing number of NGOs in itself makes the appearance of "black sheep"
among these entities more likely. It is therefore necessary to elaborate
possible enforcement mechanisms to deal with violations of international law
also by NGOs. Thus, the above mentioned developments provide at least for
a possible enforcement strategy on the domestic level against these entities.
The possible strategy of decentralized enforcement of international law
against NGOs through individual States has, however, the disadvantage,
already outlined above in connection with the adoption of a possible code of
conduct for NGOs, that at least some States might feel tempted to restrict the
activities of NGOs to a disproportionate extent by promoting the enforcement
of international law toward these entities. However, under the contemporary
international system, where the enforcement of international law is still mainly
dependent on the actions of sovereign States," the decentralized enforcement
through States to mitigate the possible negative effects caused by NGOs in the
processes of globalization seems to be the more realistic strategy at least for
some years to come.

342.See, e.g., JESSUP, supra note 164, at 17; Torsten Stein, Decentralized International Law
Enforcement: The Changing Role of the State as Law Enforcement Agent, in ALLOCATION OF LAW
ENFORCEMmT AU'rHORrrYIN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 107,126 (Jost DelbrOck ed., 1995). However,
one can also notice in contemporary international law some developments toward a more centralized
enforcement See Jost DelbrOck, A More Effective International Law or a New "World Law"?-Some
Aspects of the Development ofInternational Law in a Changing International System, 68 IND. LJ. 705,
720 (1993); JENNINOS & WAITS, supra note 12, at 11.
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Through International Governmental

Concerning the role of international organizations, the UN could function
as a supervising institution on the universal level for the conduct of NGOs,
especially taking into account the already existing intensive cooperation
between this organization and NGOs, outlined above.
International
organizations could, for example, require NGOs to employ their staffmembers
in accordance with internationally recognized standards of nondiscrimination,
and exclude organizations from consultative relationships for failing to meet
this and other human rights criteria. However, one can also think of regional
organizations like the OAS, the OAU, and the Council of Europe taking over
some of these functions for example in the form of a mandatory reporting
system on the activities of NGOs which are active in the region.
C. Self-Regulatory Regimes
A final possibility would be the enforcement of international law against
NGOs through a system of self-regulation. Certain developments in this
direction can already be located in some sectors of NGO activities.4 3 For
example, in the Philippines the National Caucus of Development NGO
Networks is working toward an agreement among its members to adopt a Code
of Ethics for Social Development Organizations, which entails standards on
how the NGOs relate to the communities they serve and also toward the
government and to each other. In the United States, the umbrella group for
private voluntary organizations engaged in foreign humanitarian help,
InterAction, has adopted a detailed set of standards which are binding on its
members, dealing with, for example, the issue of how photographs may be
used in public fund-raising. Finally, there are groups of NGOs in India
considering the development of a set of rules to govern their behavior

concerning the cooperation with the national government on projects funded
by the World Bank.
An enforcement of international legal norms through self-regulatory
regimes could include the supervision of the actions of NGOs in a certain
geographical region or field of activities through self-governed "umbrella
organizations." NGOs that are violating international legal standards could
343. On the following examples and for a more detailed analysis, see Schweitz, supra note 98, at 420.
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then face penalties from an umbrella organization and exclusion from future
concerted actions by NGOs. The self-regulatory organizations could, for
example, recommend international development banks not include certain
NGOs in future development programs.
The advantage of such sectoral, self-contained regimes for NGOs under
international law would be the diminished role of States in law enforcement.
This could lead to enforcement on a more equal basis and would also prevent
a possible abuse of enforcement power toward NGOs by some States. Thus,
the examples of already existing self-regulatory regimes for NGOs on the
domestic or regional level can also be regarded as a desirable model in the
future for enforcement mechanisms for international law on the global scene.
VII. Is THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM TRANSFORMING
INTO A GLOBAL SOCIETY?

The increasingly important role of NGOs in international relations raises
the additional question whether the contemporary international system is
undergoing fundamental changes by transforming into a global society. The
term "global society" describes a society of State actors and non-State actors
like NGOs, multinational corporations, and individuals on a global scale,
which is characterized by a multitude of decentralized lawmaking processes
in various sectors, independently of nation-states.3
Under the traditional conception, the international system contains
sovereign and, at least in the international legal fiction, coequal States.' " The
international system's mechanical structure is dominated by this conception.'
For example, the sources of international law depend on the interaction of
States in the form of treaties and customary law, or, as in the case of general

344. See Gunther Teubner, Foreword: Legal Regimes of GlobalNon-stateActors, in GLOBAL LAW
WrIHOUT A STATE xiii (Gunther Teubner ed.,1997). However, the terminology for this conception,
although describing basically the same phenomenon, varies in the legal literature. See, e.g., Anne-Marie
Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World ofLiberal States, 6 EUR. J.INT'L L 503, 518 (1995) (describing
the characteristics of a 'transnational society"); Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of
Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 429, 460 (1997) (labeling the new developing system a "world

community').
345.See WOLFoANG FRXmAMN, THE CHANoING STRUCTnR OF INTERHAIONAL LAW213 (1964);
JESSUP, supranote 164, at 17.
346. Schreuer, supranote 14, at 448.
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principles of law, are derived from the domestic legal systems of States.3 In
addition, fundamental concepts of international law, like territorial integrity,
nonintervention, and self-defense are based on the dominant role of the State
as the primary actor in the international realm.3
Although the rise of
international organizations, especially in the last four decades, adds a new
element to State interactions in the international system, the mere existence
of these entities, which are created by States, cannot necessarily be regarded
as a fundamental change in the character of the international system.
International organizations function as another forum for the interactions
between States, and thus underline the interstate nature of the traditional
international system. 9
However, in the contemporary international system, one can also observe
a variety of developments indicating that the classical State-centered
conception is no longer sufficient to describe the growing complexity of
international relations. Leaving aside the increasingly important role of
NGOs, one can notice in the course of the continuing processes of
globalization, as outlined above,3' a variety of new lawmaking processes by
non-State actors, undermining the former monopoly of States.
The primary example in this connection is the development of a lex
mercatoria, a self-regulatory regime of economic law, created by
multinational enterprises and enforced through arbitration tribunals,
independent of State involvement. 351' Although such a transnational legal
regime in the business area is not a completely new phenomenon in the
international legal realm but has its predecessor in the commercial relations
of medieval times, the 'Westphalian order"3"2 mandates sovereign States either
to traditionally promote economic activities at home or to regulate

347.See, e.g., BUEROENTHAL & MAIER, supranote 164, at 33.

348.See Martti Koskennieti, The Future of Statehood, 32 HARV. INT'L LJ. 397, 406 (1991);
Schreuer, supra note 14, at 448.
349.See Schreuer, supra note 14, at 451.
350.See supra Part IIL
351. See Hans-Joachim Mertens, LexMercatoria:A Self-Applying System Beyond NationalLaw, in
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 31 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); Jean-Philippe Rob, Multinational
Enterprises:The Constitution ofaPluralisticLegal
Order, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUTA STATE 45 (Gunther

Teubner ed., 1997)
352. On the role of the peace treaties of Westphalia in 1648 as marking the beginning of the statecentered international system, see supra PartV.A.
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international trade through treaties. 53 In the course of the processes of
globalization, one can observe a new rise and increasing importance in these
international private lawmaking procedures, which challenge the normcreating role of States.
Another example-already mentioned above in connection with the
analysis of the International Olympic Committee-is the development of a lex
sportiva internationalis354 where international regulations in the area of
international sport law are predominently created by non-State actors. 355 A
final indication for the declining role of States in certain areas of lawmaking
is the recent discussion over the creation of a so-called lex informatica,3 6
which governs the communications between individuals interacting on the
Internet, for which State-based legal norms have proven to be largely
35 7
inadequate and ineffective.
The central authority of the nation-state is also challenged by another
phenomenon worth mentioning: the growing assertion of claims and power
by sub-State entities in which people no longer define their identities and
loyalties only in terms of their State-granted nationality. 35 As Thomas Franck
recently observed, there is "a powerful wave of global localism breaking over
'
the cliffs of the State system."359
In evaluating all these different phenomena, one can observe that the
international society is undergoing some developments toward a more
pluralistic society by enhancing the number of different actors in the
international realm. However, the question remains whether it is already
possible to describe these developments as producing a transformation of the
international society toward a global society in which States constitute only

353.Fried, supra note 46, at 260.
354. For the term lex sportiva internationalis, see Gunther Teubner, Vlobal Bukowina': Legal
Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 4 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
355. See generally James R. Naftiger, International Sports Law as a Processfor Resolving Disputes,
45 INT'L & COMP. L Q. 130 (1996); GERALD SIMON, PUISSANCE SPORTIVE ET ORDRE JURIDIQUB ETATIQUE
(1990).
356. On the term lex informatica, see Aron Mefford, Note, Lex Informatica: Foundations ofLaw on
the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 211 (1997).
357.See id. at 213; see also Hercules Booysen, Is International Law Reliquishing its Exclusively
Public Law Nature ?, 4 TULSA J. COM. & INT'L L 219, 230 (1997); David Johnson & David Post, Law
and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L REV. 1367 (1997); see generally Joel R.
Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY LJ.911 (1996).
358. Schachter, supra note 147, at 15.
359. Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice,
90 AM. J. INT'L L 359, 360 (1996); see also Thomas Ki Franck, Community Based on Autonomy, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 41, 43 (1997).
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one of a whole range of actors.
Despite the variety of challenges to the predominant role of States in the
international realm, the institution of the State as such will probably not
become obsolete and wither away in the foreseeable future.' The challenges
by non-State actors to the position of nation-states, although obviously
influential in some areas, can in general be regarded as being only sectoral
"'
ones, each in itself limited to a specific interest or segment of the society.36
It thus still remains for the State, as Oscar Schachter pointed out, "to cope
with the incessant claims of competing societal groups and to provide public
justice essential to social order and responsibility." 3 2 However, on the other
side, States also have already partly changed, and have to continue to change,
their behavior in the international system by thinking less territorially and
more functionally about how to address global problems with the assistance
of non-State actors like NGOs. 3
Although one cannot conclude that we have seen a fundamental shift from
an international society toward a global society, it is nevertheless possible to
recognize certain indications of a more multilayered international system and
a society with a growing variety of authoritative actors, some of which are
very independent of States,3" most notably, MNCs and NGOs.
CONCLUSION

The analysis of the activities of NGOs in contemporary international law
demonstrates that on one side these organizations perform the important role
of critical "pressure groups" on a global level and engage in constructive
contribution to the search for solutions to global problems. On the other side,
it also becomes clear that the power and influence of these global non-State
actors in the contemporary international system, that will probably increase

360.See Schachter, supra note 147, at 22; Delbrilck, supra note 197, at 63. See also Samuel K.
Murumbaj Grapplingwith a GrotianMoment: Sovereignty and the Quest for a Normative World Order,
19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 829, 866 (1993); Miguel de laMadrid H., NationalSovereignty and Globalization,
19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 553, 560 (1997).
361. Schachter, supra note 147, at 22.
362.Id.
363. See generally RICHARD FALK, EXPLORATIONS AT THE EDGE OF TIME: THE PROSPECTS FOR
WORLD ORDER 196 (1992); Hobe, supra note 5, at 192. On the notion of "functional statehood," see
Schreuer, supra note 14, at 453.
364.See Mark W. Janis, InternationalLaw?, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 363, 368 (1991); Schreuer, supra
note 14, at 453.

1999]

LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALIZATION

in the coming years, requires an international legal incorporation of NGOs.
Although the international society has not transformed into a global
society, the growing influence and importance of non-State actors, such as
NGOs, MNCs, and individuals, require the international legal system to reflect

the changes in the international realm that are caused by the increasing
diversity of its actors. Recent attempts in this direction have been made with
growing international sensitivity toward the behavior of MNCs. Another
development worth mentioning is the increasing tendency to enact and enforce
individual responsibilities under international law. This is especially reflected
in the area of humanitarian law through the work of the International War
Crimes Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia

5

and Rwanda,' as well as the

recent attempts to create a permanent international criminal court,367 which led
to the adoption of a statute at the UN Conference in Rome on 17 July 1998.m
However, this process of strengthening the international rule of law also
requires an intensified examination of the legal role of NGOs under
contemporary international law. This Article is meant to be a small
contribution to the discussion on this evolving issue.
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